Connecticut Supreme Court

No Supreme Court decisions

Connecticut Appellate Court

Healey v. Hawkeye Construction, LLC, 124 Conn. 215 (2010):
(Flynn, C.J.) The Appellate Court held that Connecticut law applied to the plaintiff’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits because the plaintiff was a Connecticut resident and his employment contract was formed in Connecticut.  Those factors were enough to overcome the fact that the plaintiff did not perform work or become injured in Connecticut.

Singhaviroj v. Board of Education, 124 Conn. App. 228 (2010):
(Gruendel, J.) The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying its summary judgment motions.  The Appellate Court held that the motions were improperly denied without determining whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the defendant’s claims of res judicata and collateral estoppel because those issues must be resolved before any trial can take place.  The Court also held that the plaintiff’s claim of lack of jurisdiction failed because the defendant raised colorable claims of res judicata and collateral estoppels in its motion.  The plaintiff also waived any objection to those claims being filed untimely by both failing to object at trial and by arguing the merits of the issues in his response to the defendant’s summary judgment motion.  Finally, the Court held that the defendant’s claim regarding improper refusal to postpone the trial in the underlying case was moot, as the trial never actually happened.

Przekopski v. Przekop, 124 Conn. App. 238 (2010):
(Harper, J.) The trial court erred in rendering judgment for the defendant personally and then ordering that funds misappropriated by the plaintiff be returned to the estate for which the defendant served as executrix, rather than to the defendant personally, especially since it was clear that the decedent intended the funds to pass directly to the defendant, and not to be the subject of probate upon his death.

Caciopoli v. Howell, 124 Conn. App. 273 (2010):
(Robinson, J.) The Appellate Court held that the defendant’s claim on appeal was inadequate for review where he failed to request articulation on his two claims: first, the legal theory upon which the trial court granted the plaintiff’s prejudgment remedy, and second, how the trial court determined the amount of money to attach to the PJR.

Spears v. Elder, 124 Conn. App. 280 (2010):
(DiPentima, C.J.) The defendant appealed a judgment for the plaintiff on claims of slander and fraud.  The Appellate Court held that the defendant’s claim on review that the trial court failed to give the jury a requested instruction was not reviewable, as the general verdict rule precluded review.  The jury could have reached its verdict by two independent means and the defendant failed to submit any interrogatories to the jury.  Further, the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly excluded evidence was not reviewable, as it was raised for the first time on appeal.

In re Suelaka G., 124 Conn. App. 368 (2010):
(Per Curiam) The respondent mother appealed an order terminating her parental rights.  The Appellate Court held that the trial court did not err, as there was sufficient evidence in the record to support its findings.  Also, the standard by which the trial court was to measure rehabilitation was whether the parents gained the ability to care for her child, not whether she had made progress in her personal life.

Connecticut Supreme Court

No non-criminal cases.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Follacchio v. Follacchio, 124 Conn. App. 371 (2010):
(Bear, J.)  The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from a probate order approving the final accounting of the defendant, the conservator of the person and estate of the deceased.  The Superior Court denied the plaintiff’s appeal, and the plaintiff thereafter appealed to the Appellate Court.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court, holding that it improperly denied the plaintiff’s request for a trial de novo pursuant to the relevant statutes.

CMB Capital Appreciation, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 124 Conn. App. 379 (2010):
(Beach, J.)  The defendant Planning & Zoning Commission of North Haven denied the plaintiff’s site plan and amended site plan applications for an affordable housing development and the plaintiff appealed.  The trial court sustained the plaintiff’s appeal, and the Commission appealed to the Appellate Court on the granting of its petition for certification.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding, inter alia, that the trial court properly ordered the Commission to approve the plaintiff’s amended application on the condition that the plaintiff formally apply to the water pollution control authority and obtain approval for adequate sewerage service for the proposed development.  The Court also held that the trial court properly found that the reasons for the Commission’s denial of the plaintiff’s amended application were not adequately supported by the record.

In re Addie May Nesbitt, 124 Conn. App. at 400 (2010):
(DiPentima, C.J.)  The respondent moved to dismiss a risk warrant issued by statute authorizing the police to search for and seize certain firearms she owned.  The trial court denied this motion, finding that the state had proved by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent posed an imminent risk of personal injury to herself.  The respondent appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  The Court held (1) that the appeal was not moot even though the trial court had ordered that the firearms be returned to the respondent during the pendency of the appeal; (2) that the respondent possessed the firearms in that she owned them and that there was probable cause to believe that she posed an imminent risk of danger to herself or to others; and (3) that the trial court did not impermissibly shift the burden to the respondent to prove that she did not pose such a risk.

Duncan v. Mill Management Company of Greenwich, Inc., 124 Conn. App. 415 (2010):
(Sullivan, J.)  The plaintiff sued the defendant in negligence after falling on a staircase in a building owned by the defendant.  After a jury trial, the jury entered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and the trial court rendered judgment accordingly.  The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of a subsequent remedial measure taken by the defendants in constructing a new staircase.  The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant and reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the court improperly admitted evidence of the new staircase.  The Court found that this evidence was highly prejudicial and was not necessary to show feasibility of construction, as the plaintiff argued.  The Appellate Court ordered a new trial.

Neubig v. Luanci Construction, LLC, 124 Conn. App. 425 (2010):
(Bishop, J.)  The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant seeking damages for, inter alia, breach of a contract for the purchase of property intended for the development of a fourteen-lot residential subdivision.  Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the plaintiff submitted subdivision plans to the Planning and Zoning Commission of North Branford, which approved his third application subject to certain conditions.  The plaintiff failed to satisfy those conditions and sought to terminate the agreement with the defendant.  The defendant rejected the attempted termination, and the plaintiff filed suit.  The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff breached the terms of the agreement and that the trial court had properly denied the plaintiff’s claim that it impose a resulting trust on the property.

Schwarz v. Schwarz, 124 Conn. App. 472 (2010):
(Beach, J.)  The defendant appealed from the trial court’s order granting his and the plaintiff’s motions for modification of alimony and increasing his weekly alimony obligation.  He had sought modification because the plaintiff had begun living with another individual.  Conversely, the plaintiff sought modification because the defendant’s financial circumstances had significantly improved.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in determining that an upward modification of alimony was warranted.  It found that the trial court properly considered different factors when determining that a substantial change in circumstances existed and properly applied the law.

Lorenz v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission, 124 Conn. App. 489 (2010):
(Robinson, J.)  The defendant company sought to build a private country club and golf course on property it owned in Old Saybrook.  It submitted an application to this effect, which the defendant Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission granted subject to several conditions.  The plaintiffs, owners of abutting property, appealed from this decision.  The trial court sustained the plaintiffs’ appeal and remanded the case to the Commission for further consideration because one of the conditions imposed was illegal as beyond the scope of the Commission’s authority.  The defendant company thereafter submitted an application modifying its original application, which the Commission approved, and the plaintiffs again appealed to the trial court.  The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the second trial judge’s opinion was consistent with and did not violate the first trial judge’s opinion.  The plaintiffs and the defendant Commissioner of Environmental Protection, who had intervened in both appeals, both appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court properly deferred to the Commission’s decision in light of the conclusions of the first trial judge and the scope of the defendants’ modified application.

Connecticut Supreme Court

Potvin v. Lincoln Service & Equipment Co., 298 Conn. 620 (2010):
(Zarella, J.) The Supreme Court interpreted Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-850 to shield the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association from being liable for the imposition of sanctions or attorney’s fees for its undue delay in paying workers’ compensation benefits.
Katz, J., dissenting.  The term “covered claim” as used in the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association Act includes the assessment of interest and attorney’s fees under the workers’ compensation act, and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-850 does not shield the association from the assessment of sanctions or attorney’s fees for its undue delay in paying workers’ compensation benefits.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Marulli v. Wood Frame Construction Co., LLC, 124 Conn. App. 505 (2010):
(Gruendel, J.) The Appellate Court held that a trial judge improperly vacated an arbitration award on the ground of arbitral misconduct.  The Court found that the arbitrator held extensive hearings before issuing an award, despite the plaintiffs’ claims that they were not afforded a full and fair evidentiary hearing before the arbitrator summarily closed the arbitration.  Further, the trial court was incorrect in holding that the arbitrator erred in not making an explicit finding on the validity of the contract at issue.  The Appellate Court held that the arbitrator’s award of damages to the defendant implied that he found the contract valid, and that his failure to make an explicit finding was not a violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-418(a)(4). 

Piquet v. Chester, 124 Conn. App. 518 (2010):
(Robinson, J.) The plaintiff was issued a cease and desist order for her violation of a zoning ordinance.  She appealed the order to the town zoning board of appeals, but later withdrew her appeal when the town informed her that the order was being withdrawn to give her time to rectify her violation.  She subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action in the superior court seeking a judgment that under the ordinance, she was allowed to use her property as she had been before the cease and desist order.  The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, and the Appellate Court reversed with directions to dismiss her action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Because the issue on appeal was not the validity of the ordinance itself, but the zoning officer’s interpretation of the ordinance, the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by pursuing her appeal to the town zoning board of appeals.  As such, she could not bring a declaratory judgment action in superior court. 
Flynn, C.J., concurring.  The majority is correct in stating that the plaintiff lacked subject matter jurisdiction to file a declaratory judgment action.  However, on the merits of the case, the plaintiff was correct in that her use of her property was potentially allowed under the ordinance. 
Borden, J., dissenting.  There was no viable administrative remedy left to the plaintiff, so she had subject matter jurisdiction to bring her declaratory judgment action.  Judge Borden opined that a withdrawal of the cease and desist order was not a “decision” that could be appealed.  Further, the plaintiff’s use of the property was not allowed under the ordinance, and summary judgment for the defendant was appropriate.

In re Probate Appeal of Mikoshi, 124 Conn. App. 536 (2010):
(Per Curiam) The executrix of the decedent’s estate appealed the probate court’s approval of her accounting of the estate with an exception of over $67,000 that the probate court distributed half to the executrix and half to the defendant-heir.  The superior court held that the probate court erred in excepting this amount, as the decedent made a valid gift to the executrix and the money was properly withheld from the estate in the accounting.  The defendant-heir appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed, finding that the trial judge did not err in finding the gift valid.  The evidence showed that the decedent was coherent and able to expressly instruct the executrix to place the money into her own account, showing that the gift was validly made.

In re Summer S., 124 Conn. App. 540 (2010):
(Per Curiam) The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s termination of parental rights as to both parents.  The Court held that from the evidence put forth at trial, it was not clearly erroneous for the trial judge to find that the department of children and families had put forth reasonable effort to reunify the child with her parents, but that the parents were unable to attain suitable housing, unable to address their financial problems and unable to address the mother’s mental health and substance abuse issues or to fix the father’s “detrimental codependence” on the mother.  Further, the father declined to take advantage of some services offered by the department.  Additionally, the Appellate Court held that the record held sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the father failed to rehabilitate himself enough to show that he could assume a responsible position in the child’s life.

Charbonneau v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 124 Conn. App. 556 (2010):
(Per Curiam) The plaintiff appealed the decision of the Commissioner to revoke his driver’s license for ten months and disqualifying him from operating a commercial vehicle permanently after the plaintiff was arrested for driving under the influence.  The plaintiff appealed, claiming that the results of the breathalyzer test administered to him could not be relied upon because the police officer who gave him the test had not been recertified in the administration of breathalyzer tests within the twelve months preceding the plaintiff’s arrest.  The recertification is required by Conn. Gen. Stat. §14-227a-10b(d)(1)(B)(ii).  The Appellate Court, relying on recent Supreme Court precedent, held that the Commissioner was able to consider and rely on the breathalyzer test, despite the officer’s lack of recent recertification. 

In re Albert M., 124 Conn. App. 561 (2010):
(Per Curiam) The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s termination of the father’s parental rights.  It was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that the department of children and families made reasonable efforts to reunify the father, but that the father had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation.  Specifically, the court did not credit the father’s testimony that he was unaware that he had to end his association with the child’s mother, in light of his actual knowledge that he had to change his relationship with the mother to continue his parental rights.  Further, the trial court did not err in finding that due to the child’s need for stability and permanency, termination was in the best interest of the child and the father had exhausted his opportunity to demonstrate his ability to assume a responsible position in the child’s life.

Crelan v. Crelan, 124 Conn. App. 567 (2010):
(Alvord, J.) Where an appellant provided only the transcript from the hearing on the motion for judgment of dismissal that she was appealing, and not a transcript from her case in chief as presented at trial, the Appellate Court held that the record was inadequate for review and declined to review her claim. 

Connecticut Supreme Court

Butts v. Bysiewicz, 298 Conn. 665 (2010):
(This firm, Horton, Shields & Knox, P.C. represented the plaintiff).
(Katz, J.)  A candidate for judge of probate brought an action seeking an injunction to compel the Secretary of State to place his name on the ballot in the general election as the political party’s endorsed candidate.  The candidate had failed to deliver the certificate of his political party’s endorsement to the Secretary of State within the statutorily prescribed deadline.  The trial court denied the candidate’s request for an injunction and the candidate appealed.  The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court certified the candidate’s issue on appeal as involving a question of substantial public interest and transferred it to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and held that (1) compliance with the statutory deadline for filing a certificate of endorsement is mandatory and is established by actual receipt of the certificate; (2) the Secretary of State has no discretion to give legal effect to a certificate of endorsement if it is delivered untimely; and (3) the court could not invoke its equitable authority to compel the Secretary of State to place the candidate’s name on the ballot.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Hogan v. Lagosz, 124 Conn. App. 602 (2010):
(Gruendel, J.)  The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment determining the rights of the parties as to a claimed right-of-way over the defendant’s property that led to the plaintiffs’ landlocked property.  The trial court thereafter granted the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce a settlement agreement that they claimed the parties had reached regarding the existence of that easement, and the defendant appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant’s attorney had apparent authority to sign the settlement agreement and that the settlement agreement was clear and unambiguous as to the location of the new right-of-way.  The Court held that the record was inadequate for review of the defendant’s claim that the agreement was unenforceable due to a mutual mistake because the record lacked any factual findings on that issue and the defendant failed to seek an articulation with respect to that issue.

In re Jocquyce C., 124 Conn. App. 619 (2010):
(Pellegrino, J.)  The trial court terminated the respondent mother’s parental rights as to the minor child and the respondent appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not commit clear error in finding that the mother failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation because, while the respondent had shown improvement in treating her substance abuse problem, her situation remained unstable because of her failure to acknowledge her habitual involvement in domestic violence.  The Court also held that the trial court’s determination that the termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child was not clearly erroneous because the court properly considered the required statutory factors and properly balanced the respondent’s progress against the effect that further delay would have on the child.

In re Devon W., 124 Conn. App. 631 (2010):
(Borden, J.)  The respondent mother and three of her minor children filed separate appeals from the judgments of the trial court terminating the mother’s parental rights as to those children.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court, holding that (1) the trial court properly denied the mother’s motion to dismiss the termination petitions filed by the department of children and families (DCF) because DCF produced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case against the mother; (2) the evidence in the record was adequate to support the trial court’s determination that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with her children; (3) the evidence in the record was adequate to support the trial court’s determination that the mother had failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation; (4) the mother’s unpreserved claim on appeal that the trial court violated her constitutionally protected liberty interest by terminating her parental rights based solely on concerns about her mental health failed to pass review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (1989); and (5) the record contained clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s finding that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights of the mother.

In re Katia M., 124 Conn. App. 650 (2010):
(Lavine, J.)  The respondent father appealed from the judgment of the trial court terminating the father’s parental rights as to the minor child.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court’s finding that the father was unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification services was not improperly predicated on the father’s incarceration alone.  The Court also held that the trial court’s determinations that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite the father with his child and that the father had failed to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation were not clearly erroneous and were adequately supported by the record.