Connecticut Supreme Court

Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 298 Conn. 703 (2010):
(Zarella, J.) The plaintiff appealed from a trial court decision dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal from the decision of the defendant commission ordering the plaintiff to disclose information contained in its sex offender registry pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §54-255.  The Supreme Court held that in interpreting the meaning of “registration information,” a term used in the statute that had not been subject to judicial scrutiny before, the trial court should have reviewed the commission’s decision via plenary review, rather than for an abuse of discretion.   In construing the meaning of the term for the first time, the Court also held that “registration information” means “any information about the offender that has been received by the department [of public safety] from various agencies and individuals entered into the registry.”  The Court reversed the trial court’s decision dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal.
Katz, J., concurring.  Justice Katz agreed that plenary review was the correct standard to apply on appeal.  However, she found that some of the information was not “registration information” subject to the nondissemination order of §54-255.  In her opinion, only the name and location of the court to which the case was assigned was information that should not have been disclosed.  The other information, including the name of the convicted sex offender, the name of the judge, the names of the prosecuting and defense attorneys, and other information could be disclosed.

Bysiewicz v. Dinardo, 298 Conn. 748 (2010):
(Norcott, J.) (Horton, Shields & Knox represented the plaintiff-appellee.) The plaintiff, who was a declared candidate for the office of Attorney General and who held the position of Secretary of the State, brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that her service as Secretary was the “active practice” of law for the purpose of qualifying her to become Attorney General.  The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that her activities while serving as Secretary were not sufficient to meet the “active practice” requirement.  Further, the Court held that the statute requiring ten years “active practice” at the bar of the State did not violate the State constitution.
Bishop, J., concurring (with whom Pamler, J. joined).  Judge Bishop agreed with the  majority’s conclusion with one exception.  The majority believed that “active practice” must include litigation experience; Judge Bishop disagreed.

Zahringer v. Zahringer, 124 Conn. App. 672 (2010):
(Beach, J.) (Horton, Shields & Knox represented the defendant-appellant.) In modifying an award of unallocated alimony and child support, the trial court properly concluded that payments made to the ex-wife from her father were loans, not gifts, and were properly excluded from consideration in valuing the ex-wife’s income.  The trial court also properly allocated the husband’s $1.2 million distribution from his capital accumulation plan as income to him.  The Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s modification, however, because the trial judge used an improper date in calculating the ex-husband’s payments.  Specifically, the trial court used the date of the wife’s initial motion to modify rather than the date of the hearing following the Supreme Court’s reversal and remand of the order on the motion to modify.

St. Paul's Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, 124 Conn. App. 728 (2010):
(Schaller, J.) In this summary process action, the landlord sought to evict his tenant’s adult son, who was not himself a tenant.  The landlord served both the pretermination notice and the notice to quit on the son at the same time, despite the procedure in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-15 that requires 15 days between notices.  The Appellate Court held that this defect did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, however, because the 15-day protection in § 47a-15 only applies to tenants of the landlord, which the son was not.  Hence, the notice to quit was not defective.  Further, the son waived any jurisdictional defects as to the timeliness of the return of the complaint by not filing a motion to dismiss on those grounds.

Pena v. Petano, 124 Conn. App. 752 (2010):
(Per Curiam) A real estate broker initially sued her client for a commission allegedly due to her for selling the client’s house.  The client died after suit was commenced, and the trial court substituted the client’s estate as the defendant.  The court rendered judgment in favor of the broker.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment, following Conn. Gen. Stat. §20-325a, holding that, despite the fact that the client did not sign the listing agreement, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the transaction and it would be inequitable to deny the broker her commission.

In re Brian W., 124 Conn. App. 787 (2010):
(Per Curiam) The mother of the minor child petitioned the court to remove the child’s grandparents as guardians and to reinstate her own guardianship.  The court granted the motion, and the grandparents appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the mother had resolved the issues that caused her to initially lose custody, namely her lack of stable housing and her unwillingness to accept parental responsibilities.  The Appellate Court found that the factual records before the trial court supported the conclusion that the mother had resolved her issues and that reinstating her guardianship was in the best interests of the children.

Connecticut Supreme Court

Reale et al. v. Bysiewicz, Secretary of the State of Conn., et al., 298 Conn. 808 (2010):
The plaintiff, a candidate for Congress and his campaign committee, filed an emergency petition for injunctive relief seeking, inter alia, to require the defendant Secretary of State to place his name on the ballot in the general election as the Libertarian Party candidate.  His petition also sought to require the Secretary of State to hire an independent agency to audit her election records and security protocols.  The defendant had informed the plaintiff that he had failed to qualify as a petitioning candidate because he had not been nominated by a major or minor party and because he had failed to obtain the requisite number of signatures from individuals registered to vote in his district, both as statutorily required.  Thereafter the defendant’s staff inadvertently listed the plaintiff as a candidate in his district in a voter guide on the defendant’s official website.  The defendant’s staff subsequently noticed the error and rectified it before the deadline for completing the guide.  A single Justice heard the petition and held that the mere fact that the candidate’s name had been inadvertently published on the voter guide website did not entitle the candidate to have his name on the general election ballot.  The plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief was denied.

Sequenzia et al. v. Guerrieri Masonry, Inc., et al., 298 Conn. 816 (2010):
(This firm, Horton, Shields & Knox, P.C. represented the appellant in this appeal).
(Norcott, J.)  The plaintiff brought suit to recover damages from the defendant subcontractor at the job site where the plaintiff was working and had sustained personal injuries.  After a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant renewed a motion for a directed verdict and filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.  The defendant claimed that the trial court improperly had charged the jury on the failure to warn specification of common-law negligence and that there was no evidence to support that charge.  The trial court denied the motions and the defendant appealed but did not raise the claim of instructional impropriety on appeal.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial.  Even though the defendant had not raised its instructional impropriety claim on appeal, the Court concluded that the trial court improperly had denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the grounds of instructional impropriety.  Upon the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court, holding that because it was undisputed that the defendant did not raise a claim of instructional impropriety on appeal, that claim was effectively abandoned and the Appellate Court improperly rendered judgment based on that claim.  Additionally, the Court held that because the Appellate Court did not order supplemental briefing or argument on the instructional impropriety claim, the plaintiff was therefore deprived of the opportunity to be heard on that issue before the Appellate Court.

AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dep’t of Correction et al., 298 Conn. 824 (2010):
(Katz, J.)  The plaintiff union filed an application to vacate an arbitration award upholding the defendant’s discharge of an employee.  The employee had been arrested and charged with several criminal charges involving an alleged threat to shoot a co-worker and off-duty drug possession and had accepted accelerated rehabilitation for the charges.  After informing the defendant of the same, the defendant dismissed the employee from state service.  The plaintiff filed a grievance on behalf of the employee, which was denied, and the plaintiff proceeded to arbitration.  The arbitrator concluded that although the claims against the employee could not be fully substantiated, her request for and acceptance into the accelerated rehabilitation program indicated her acceptance of responsibility for the charges and constituted substantial evidence of her violations.  The arbitrator denied the grievance and the plaintiff filed the application to vacate with the trial court.  The trial court denied the application and the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that there was no public policy prohibiting an arbitrator from drawing an inference from a party’s acceptance of accelerated rehabilitation and that the plaintiff had thus failed to show egregious or patently irrational error.  The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court.  The Court held that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that there was no such public policy, as the legislative history clearly demonstrated its existence.  The Court also found that the arbitrator had violated public policy in coming to that conclusion and, as such, it did not afford its usual deferential standard of review which would otherwise uphold the remainder of the award.

Plato Associates, LLC v. Environmental Compliance Services, Inc., 298 Conn. 852 (2010):
(Palmer, J.)  The plaintiff company sought to finance the acquisition of commercial property located in Branford.  In order to secure a loan, it was required to provide an environmental site assessment of the property to determine whether the property posed an environmental hazard.  The plaintiff contracted with the named defendant to conduct the assessment.  The defendant conducted the assessment, which included taking a sampling from the property, and issued a report, signed by defendant professional engineer, concluding that the property did not pose an environmental hazard.  On the basis of that report, the plaintiff secured the loan and financed the property.  The plaintiff subsequently discovered records indicating that hazardous waste previously had been generated on the property and that, contrary to the defendant’s earlier assessment, the property posed an environmental hazard.  The plaintiff thereafter filed suit against the defendants claiming breach of contract and negligence.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the expiration of the relevant statutes of limitations and rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that the applicable limitation period was a longer period set forth in a separate statute of limitation.  After the plaintiff appealed, the Supreme Court transferred the case to itself.  The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that summary judgment had been granted improperly.  Specifically, the Court concluded that there existed genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants’ services were performed in such ways as to constitute improvements to property within the meaning of the statute of limitation under which the plaintiff initially asserted that its claims.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Behrns v. Behrns, 124 Conn. App. 794 (2010):
(Flynn, J.)  After the trial court had dissolved the parties’ marriage, the former wife plaintiff brought a postjudgment motion for contempt, alleging that the former husband defendant had failed to pay alimony and child support in according with the terms of the dissolution agreement.  The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion on the basis that the provision in the dissolution agreement for a decrease in the husband’s payment obligations was self-executing, and the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that said provision was not self-executing.  On remand, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff for past due alimony and child support and awarded her attorneys’ fees.  The defendant appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case.  On remand again, the trial court found the defendant to be in willful contempt and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.  The defendant again appealed, and the Appellate Court – in the present opinion – affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  The Court held that on remand after the second appeal, the trial court was required to follow the mandate in the second appeal, regardless of whatever direction or mandate the Appellate Court had offered in the first appeal and that any error on the part of the trial court at that point was invited by the defendant.  Additionally, the Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when finding the defendant in contempt, awarding attorneys’ fees, determining the starting date for an award of interest, and requiring the defendant to refrain from encumbering his assets without first obtaining court approval. 

Friends of Animals, Inc. v. United Illuminating Co., 124 Conn. App. 823 (2010):
(Robinson, J.)  The plaintiff, an animal welfare group, sought a declaratory judgment that certain acts and practices of the defendant violated the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971.  The plaintiff specifically alleged that the defendant’s destruction and capturing of monk parakeets nesting on power lines and electrical equipment unreasonably impaired or destroyed the public trust in a natural resource of the state.  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to make out a prima facie case and the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to the admission of deposition transcript portions of certain employees of the defendant as statements of a party opponent, which was also disclosed late.  The Court also held that the plaintiff was properly precluded from calling, in the middle of the trial, the defendant’s expert witness to testify as its own expert.  Finally, the Court concluded that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of conduct reasonably likely to unreasonably impair or destroy the public trust in a natural resource of the state and that the Wild Bird Act was the proper standard for determining unreasonableness under the Environmental Act at issue.

Ursini v. Barnett, 124 Conn. App. 855 (2010):
(Per Curiam.)  The plaintiff filed a summary process action to regain possession of property leased to the defendant, who had sold the property to the plaintiff to avoid foreclosure.  The parties had a one-year lease agreement that required the defendant to make monthly rental payments, and although the defendant paid the first month’s rent, he failed to make any payments thereafter.  When the plaintiff brought the present action, the defendant claimed that the transaction between the parties was fraudulent and that the lease was therefore illegal.  The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the evidence in the record sufficiently supported the trial court’s findings that the parties entered a written lease, that the defendant failed to make monthly payments in violation of the lease, and that when the defendant was in arrears, the plaintiff followed the proper procedure for a summary process action.  The Court also concluded that the defendant failed to produce any evidence that the lease was subject to the defenses of illegality and fraud that he had raised.

Law Offices of Robert K. Walsh, LLC v. Natarajan, 124 Conn. App. 860 (2010):
(Peters, J.)  The plaintiff law firm sued the defendant, its client, for breach of contract and quantum meruit, seeking the payment of fees for representation of the client in her marriage dissolution action.  The defendant asserted legal malpractice as a counterclaim.  The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff both on the complaint and on the defendant’s counterclaim, and the defendant appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the defendant could not recover on her claim for legal malpractice where she failed to present any expert testimony regarding causation and damages.  The Court also held that the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly determined the amount owed to the plaintiff in attorneys’ fees could not prevail.  The trial court is the sole arbiter of credibility and was properly within its broad discretion in making its determination of fees owed based on testimony of the plaintiff’s witness that it credited.  Finally, the Court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court had improperly enforced an hourly rate agreement because it was unpreserved.

Albuquerque v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 124 Conn. App. 866 (2010):
(Lavine, J.)  The defendant, the State Employees Retirement Commission, issued a declaratory ruling denying a request by the plaintiff, a police officer’s widow, to posthumously change her deceased husband’s election of a straight life annuity to a fifty percent spousal benefit option pursuant to the relevant statute.  The plaintiff appealed, and the trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of standing.  The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court which affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that pursuant to the language of the statute, the plaintiff was not within the class of persons the statute was intended to benefit.  As such, the trial court had properly determined that she was not aggrieved by the defendant’s declaratory ruling and had no standing to appeal.

Rockville Bank v. Victory Outreach Ministries, Inc., 125 Conn. App. 1 (2010):
(Gruendel, J.)  The plaintiff bank filed an action to foreclose on two parcels of property – one developed and one undeveloped – owned by the defendant.  The defendant had executed the mortgage in favor of the plaintiff as security for a loan.  The trial court rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale on both parcels and thereafter approved the sale of the undeveloped parcel of land; the defendant appealed from that judgment.  The defendant’s claim on appeal was that the parties had reached an agreement the day before the parcels were to be sold that the defendant would be granted an additional six months to pay off the loan in full, and so the trial court should not have ordered or approved the sale of the properties.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the record supported the trial court’s approval of the sale of the properties as well as a finding that the defendant had not wholly complied with the terms of the parties’ agreement.  Accordingly, the trial court was well within its broad discretion in finding for the plaintiff.

Myrtle Mews Association, Inc. v. Charles Bordes et al., 125 Conn. App. 12 (2010):
(Per Curiam.)  The plaintiff filed suit to foreclose a statutory lien on property owned by one defendant and over which another defendant also held a mortgage.  Both defendants failed to appear and were defaulted.  The trial court thereafter granted the plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure and rendered judgment accordingly.  The second defendant filed a motion to open the judgment, which the trial court denied.  The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court’s judgment was void because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it as a result of insufficient process and service of process.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the record was insufficient for appellate review.  Specifically, the Court noted that the trial court had made no factual findings relating to the defendant’s incorporation as a business, which findings were essential to the claim to the defendant's claim regarding personal jurisdiction.

LaSalle Bank, N.A. Trustee v. Randall, 125 Conn. App. 31 (2010):
(Per Curiam.)  The plaintiff bank filed suit to foreclose a mortgage on property owned by the defendant.  Thereafter, another company was substituted as the plaintiff.  The trial court rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale and approved the sale of the property, and the defendant appealed.  The defendant claimed that the trial court improperly approved the sale because the substituted plaintiff had submitted an inflated appraisal that discouraged other bidders and allowed it to purchase the property for an inequitable bid price.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the record was inadequate for appellate review.  Specifically, the Court noted that the trial court’s decision contained no findings as to whether any bidders were actually precluded from bidding as a result of the substituted plaintiff’s appraisal and, because the defendant failed to seek an articulation of the court’s decision, the record was inadequate for review.

Wilfred J. Megin v. New Milford, 125 Conn. App. 35 (2010):
(Gruendel, J.)  The board of assessment appeals of the defendant town denied the plaintiff’s appeal from the valuation of certain property.  The plaintiff thereafter appealed to the trial court, which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.  The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court had properly determined that because the property was owned by the plaintiff “as trustee” and because the plaintiff had appealed in his own name individually, the appeal was brought by someone who did not own the property, was not aggrieved and therefore had no standing.  The Appellate Court found it significant that the plaintiff did not dispute the trial court’s finding that he was not the record owner of the property, which was a necessary finding to the court’s determination that there was no subject matter jurisdiction.  The Court also addressed the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant should have been collaterally estopped from raising the issue of standing because of a prior tax foreclosure proceeding that had been brought against the plaintiff in his individual capacity.  The Court found the doctrine of collateral estoppel was inapplicable.

Connecticut Supreme Court

Aqleh v. Cadlerock Joint Venture II, LP, 299 Conn. 84 (2010):
(McLachlan, J.)  The plaintiff, Cadlerock Joint Venture II, LP, brought suit to recover on a promissory note guaranteed by the defendant, Aqleh, and its prejudgment attachment of the defendant’s property in that action.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to timely file suit.  The Supreme Court thereafter affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but the plaintiff nevertheless did not release its attachment of the defendant’s property.  As a result, in a separate action, the defendant filed an application to discharge the attachment.  The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to cite in the defendant as an additional defendant in the first action and a request for a temporary injunction prohibiting the defendant from conveying or encumbering the attached property.  The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motions and granted the defendant’s application.  The plaintiff appealed from both judgments, and the Supreme Court transferred the joint appeal to itself.  The Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court, holding that a motion to cite in an additional defendant does not constitute an “action” within the meaning of the accidental failure of suit statute, and that therefore, the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff’s motion did not constitute a “new action” for the purpose of applying the statute of limitations.  The Court also preliminarily determined that the trial court’s rulings denying the motion to cite in an additional defendant and granting the application to discharge the attachment are both appealable final judgments.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Trevorrow v. Marcuccio, 125 Conn. App. 141 (2010):
(Gruendel, J.)  The plaintiff, Trevorrow, filed suit to recover damages from the defendant, Marcuccio, for, inter alia, breach of contract.  The defendant and her sister had formed a metal works business, and the sister and her husband had loaned the business $65,000 to purchase machinery for the business.  After the business was dissolved, the parties entered into an oral partnership agreement whereby the plaintiff obtained a $65,000 home equity loan in order to pay the preexisting loan and the parties formed a new business.  The plaintiff thereafter filed suit, claiming that the defendant had breached her fiduciary duties to the plaintiff under a constructive trust on the money paid in satisfaction of the loan by diverting the assets of the trust to herself and by spending those assets for personal gain.  The trial court found for the plaintiff in part and for the defendant on her counterclaim.  The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly determined that she had been unjustly enriched by the loan from the plaintiff to the business.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court’s determination of unjust enrichment on the part of the defendant was not clearly erroneous and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the equitable remedy of a constructive trust on the basis of unjust enrichment.

Bartlett v. Metropolitan District Commission, 125 Conn. App. 149 (2010):
(West, J.)  The plaintiff filed suit to recover damages in negligence from the defendant, the Metropolitan District Commission, for injuries he allegedly received while stepping into an improperly positioned storm drain.  As a special defense, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s injuries were sustained as a result of an allegedly defective road and that the exclusive remedy for his claim therefore fell under the Defective Highway Statute.  Accordingly, the defendant moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was controlled by the Highway Defect Statute, which required the plaintiff to provide the Commission with timely notice of the claim, which the plaintiff did not do.  Additionally, the Court held that the trial court properly ruled on the motion to dismiss without holding an evidentiary hearing because there was no critical factual dispute regarding either the elements of the plaintiff’s claim or the issue of jurisdiction.

Kindred Nursing Centers Ease, LLC v. Morin, 125 Conn. App. 165 (2010):
(Peters, J.)  The plaintiff, a nursing home, filed suit to recover damages from the defendant, a resident’s attorney in fact, for negligence in having failed to cooperate in the determination of the continued Medicaid eligibility of the resident.  The resident had conferred a power of attorney on the defendant authorizing him to act on the resident’s behalf, including providing the Department of Social Services (DSS) with information about the resident’s bank accounts and his Medicaid eligibility.  The defendant failed to provide the DSS with this information and the plaintiff thereby incurred substantial unreimbursed expenses in caring for the resident until his death.  The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the defendant had no duty to assist the nursing home in securing the continuation of the resident’s eligibility for Medicaid financing.  Moreover, because the plaintiff did not ask the trial court to articulate the grounds for its decision, the record contained no statement explaining the court’s reasoning and the Appellate Court could not find any support in the record for the plaintiff’s claims on appeal.

James v. Valley-Shore YMCA, Inc., 125 Conn. App. 174 (2010):
(Gruendel, J.)  The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant for negligence for personal injuries she suffered when she slipped and fell on the steps of a ladder as she entered a pool on the defendant fitness center’s property.  She alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to properly maintain the pool ladder.  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant had notice of the allegedly defective ladder.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that there was no evidence in the record that the defendant had constructive notice of the alleged defective condition, which notice is required in order to support the plaintiff’s negligence claim.

Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 125 Conn. App. 201 (2010):
(Per Curiam.)  The plaintiff filed suit to foreclose a mortgage on the defendant’s property, and the trial court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale.  The defendant filed a bankruptcy petition before the sale of the property, which stayed the proceedings.  When the bankruptcy stay was lifted, the plaintiff filed a motion to reopen and reenter the judgment, to which the defendant objected.  The defendant also filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to produce the original note to prove that it had standing to institute the action.  The trial court rendered judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant appealed, claiming that because he had raised the issue of the plaintiff’s standing, the trial court had improperly failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if it had subject matter jurisdiction.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that because jurisdiction hinges on a factual determination regarding the plaintiff’s status as holder of the note when it instituted the action, the trial court improperly failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing to ascertain the same.

Jordan v. Jordan, 125 Conn. App. 207 (2010):
(Per Curiam.)  The trial court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage of the parties, and thereafter entered two corrected memoranda of decision that served to correct scrivener’s errors within the judgment.  The defendant wife filed a motion for a new trial, claiming the second corrected memorandum of decision was untimely.  The trial court denied the defendant’s motion and the defendant appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court permissibly opened its dissolution judgment and issued corrected memoranda of decision within the four month time frame permitted by the statute governing substantive corrections of civil judgments or decrees.

In re Paul O., 125 Conn. App. 212 (2010):
(Hennessy, J.)  The trial court sustained an order of temporary custody concerning the respondent mother’s minor child, who was the subject of a neglect petition.  The trial court’s decision was based on its finding that the child, an infant, would continue to be in imminent risk of physical harm if he was returned to the mother’s custody.  The mother appealed, and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  Specifically, the Court held that substantial evidence of the mother’s mental condition, the mother’s history of mental illness, and the hazardous state of the mother’s apartment existed in the record supporting the trial court’s decision.

Westbrook Police Union, Local 1257, Council 15 v. Westbrook, 125 Conn. App. 225 (2010):
(Per Curiam.)  The plaintiff police union applied to vacate an arbitration award that failed to order the reinstatement of a part-time police officer after he had been discharged from employment by the defendant town.  The plaintiff claimed that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority and violated public policy in rendering such an award.  The trial court denied the plaintiff’s application and the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the submission by the plaintiff of its issue to the arbitration panel was unrestricted and, as such, failure of the panel to order reinstatement could not be construed as a failure to conform to the submission in excess of its authority.  In addition, the Court held that the failure of the panel to order reinstatement did not violate clear public policy.

Connecticut Supreme Court

No cases this week to report on.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Bento v. Bento, 125 Conn. App. 229 (2010):
(Robinson, J.) The plaintiff appealed the financial orders of the trial court incident to its judgment of dissolution of the plaintiff’s marriage.  The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion in splitting a corporate debt between the parties where there was no finding that a debt was actually owed.  Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding monthly alimony and dividing the parties’ assets (approximately 40% to the plaintiff and 60% to the defendant) where it considered the length of the marriage and the parties' ages; the plaintiff’s health problems; the plaintiff’s employment history and level of education; and the fact that the plaintiff engaged in at least one extramarital affair. 

Danzig v. PDPA, Inc., 125 Conn. App. 242 (2010):
(Bear, J.) The plaintiff sought to foreclose on a mortgage held by the defendant company and guaranteed by the company’s president and vice president.  The plaintiff also sought a deficiency judgment against the company and the guarantors.  The Appellate Court held that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment against the guarantors on their counterclaims, despite the fact that the plaintiff had withdrawn his complaint against the guarantors.  Further, the Court held that summary judgment was properly rendered because Practice Book § 17-44 was not violated and because the trial court gave all parties an opportunity to be heard on the motion. 

Danzig v. PDPA, Inc., 125 Conn. App. 254 (2010):
(Bear, J.) The plaintiff sought to foreclose on a mortgage held by the defendant company and guaranteed by the company’s president and vice president.  The company had transferred its rights, title and interest in the mortgaged property to the president of the company, A.  The trial court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale, from which the company appealed.  The  Appellate Court held that the company did have standing to appeal because it was the record owner of the property when the foreclosure was commenced and because it had executed a promissory note and remained liable for any deficiency judgment that might enter. Also, the judgment of foreclosure, which set forth the method of foreclosure and the amount of the debt, was a final appealable judgment.  Lastly, the Court held that the trial court properly refused to allow the company to file a responsive pleading to the plaintiff’s amended complaint where the company was previously defaulted for failure to disclose a defense and where the company’s motion to open the default was denied.

Kovalsick v. Kovalsick, 125 Conn. App. 265 (2010):
(Schaller, J.) The trial court erred in failing to award the plaintiff time limited or rehabilitative alimony because the record demonstrated that the plaintiff earned approximately one-fifth of the defendant’s typical earnings; no evidence was presented that she would be able to earn any more without additional education and training; and the plaintiff was held responsible for the marriage’s entire debt amount, but could be in dire financial straits without either alimony or a portion of the marital property. 

Shelton v. Olowosoyo, 125 Conn. App. 286 (2010):
(Pellegrino, J.) Where the defendants continued to perform work on a contract after the plaintiff failed to adhere to the payment schedule in the contract, the court properly found that there was mutual assent to modify the original payment schedule, and found for the plaintiff on the defendant’s counterclaim for breach of contract.   Further, the evidence indicated that the completion date of the contract was extended three times by agreement of both parties, and as such, the trial court properly found that the date was enforceable, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages and that the defendants had not been unjustly enriched.

Taylor v. Pervis, 125 Conn. App. 321 (2010):
(Bishop, J.) The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to open a motion to open a default under the extraordinary circumstances in this case.  Here, defendant’s counsel was unable to attend the hearing on the motion to open because he was conducting a jury trial in a different courtroom in the same courthouse at the same time as the hearing.  Plaintiff’s counsel and defendant’s counsel had seemingly agreed to mark the hearing over to another day, but the trial judge conducted the hearing and denied the motion.  The Appellate Court held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to fail to acknowledge that counsel could not reasonably be in two courtrooms at the same time.