Connecticut Supreme Court

In re Jaime S., 300 Conn. 294 (2011):
(Per Curiam.)  The trial court terminated the parental rights of the respondent father following a hearing held after the petitioner mother filed a petition for said termination.  The respondent was unable to attend the hearing because of his detention by immigration authorities in New Mexico.  He was represented by counsel and was able to participate on the first day of the hearing via telephone.  On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  The respondent filed a petition for certification to the Supreme Court, which the Supreme Court granted.  After examining the record and considering the briefs and oral arguments, however, the Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that certification was improvidently granted.

Caminis v. Troy, 300 Conn. 297 (2011):
(Eveleigh, J.)  The plaintiffs, Perry D. Caminis et al., owned waterfront property on a river in Norwalk and sued the defendants, abutting property owners, claiming that the defendants had encroached onto their littoral rights, that is, the property they owned that included the part of the river closest to the shore.  Specifically, the plaintiffs sought an injunction ordering the defendants to remove their dock system that intruded onto the part of the water owned by the plaintiffs.  The defendants had purchased their property in 1991 without any notice of any property encroachment issues that that their floating dock imposed.  The previous owners had constructed and replaced the dock pursuant to state permits issued in 1957 and 1984.  The plaintiffs purchased their property in 1975 and in 2000 asked the defendants to relocate their dock to accommodate the plaintiffs’ proposal for their own dock.  The defendants refused to do so and in 2005 the plaintiffs filed suit.  After judgment for the defendants after a finding of laches, the plaintiffs appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed, finding, inter alia, that the trial court had property found that the defendants had proved their special defense of laches.  Upon the granting of certification petitioned for by the plaintiff, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court on the alternative ground that the plaintiffs’ action was barred because it was brought outside the 15-year statutory limitations period, the defendants having established that they adversely possessed the contested littoral area.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Belica v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 126 Conn. App. 779 (2011):
(Beach, J.)  The plaintiff had filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits but failed to attend several independent medical examinations mandated by his employer.  As a result, his employment was terminated and he thereafter sought unemployment compensation benefits.  The Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act – the defendant – denied the plaintiff’s claim and the plaintiff appealed.  The appeals referee reversed the decision of the defendant, and the defendant appealed.  The Employment Security Board of Review sustained the defendant’s appeal and the plaintiff appealed to the trial court.  The trial court sustained the plaintiff’s appeal and remanded the case for a hearing, and the defendant appealed.  Finally, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that because the plaintiff’s appeal to the trial court challenged only the Board’s factual determinations, the trial court therefore lacked the authority to consider the plaintiff’s challenge to those findings in the absence of a timely motion to correct pursuant to P.B. § 22-4, which the plaintiff had never filed.

Smart v. Corbitt, 126 Conn. App. 788 (2011):
(DiPentima, C.J.)  The plaintiff Jerry Smart, the Administrator of the estate of Alfred Smart, who had died in a house fire, brought a wrongful death action against the defendants police officer, fire marshal and city.  The trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of the defendant police officer, and, after a jury trial, entered judgment in favor of the defendants fire marshal and city in accordance with the jury’s verdict.  The plaintiff appealed on, inter alia, various evidentiary grounds.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that (1) the trial court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s experts’ testimony was warranted as a sanction for the plaintiff’s untimely disclosure of those experts; (2) the police officer was entitled to discretionary act immunity; (3) the attorney for the defendant police officer did not misstate the law of proximate cause during jury voir dire; (4) the defendant fire marshal’s testimony that no other communities complied with smoke detector inspection requirements was relevant to prove that he was acting in good faith when he failed to inspect the premises; (5) the trial court properly determined that questions regarding the defendant city’s response to the plaintiff’s freedom of information request were not relevant; (6) any error in the court’s failure to provide a requested interrogatory to the jury was harmless; and (7) the trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict.

Szekeres v. Szekeres, 126 Conn. App. 829 (2011):
(Bishop, J.)  The plaintiffs, former tenants, filed suit against the defendant landlord (one of the plaintiffs’ mother), landlord’s daughter (one of the plaintiffs’ sister) and landlord’s son-in-law (one of the plaintiffs’ brother-in-law).  The plaintiffs alleged claims including forcible entry and detainer, illegal lockout, conversion and a violation of CUTPA, which all arose when the plaintiffs were evicted from their rental house.  After having been served with an eviction notice, the plaintiffs agreed to vacate the house on a certain day.  When the defendants went to the house on that day, they found that the house had been destroyed; among other things, fixtures were missing, feces were on the flood, there was trash everywhere, it smelled of urine, and the doors had been nailed shut with two-by-four boards.  The plaintiffs brought a second suit against the defendants for slander and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress after this date, and a third suit alleging statutory theft, trespass, malicious prosecution and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress after this date.  The three actions were consolidated and tried to a jury, and in each action, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.  The plaintiffs appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding, inter alia, that the plaintiffs had abandoned the house, that the plaintiffs left no personal property of value in the house, and that the evidence supported the defendants’ claim against the plaintiffs for willful and malicious destruction of the house.  In addition, the Court held that the trial court properly denied the plaintiffs’ remaining claims.

Jansma v. Patrons Mutual Ins. Co. of Connecticut, Inc., 126 Conn. App. 855 (2011):
(Gruendel, J.)  The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant homeowner’s insurance company, who issued them a homeowner’s insurance policy, for breach of contract.  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant acted in bad faith by prematurely submitting their claim to appraisal after a fire at their home rendered their house unlivable, which thereby unnecessarily delayed the repair of their residence.  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the record supported the court’s ruling in that the policy explicitly provided that if the plaintiffs and the defendant did not agree on the amount of the cost to repair the residence, either party could demand that that amount be determined by appraisal.  The parties had such a disagreement in this case and the defendant, pursuant to the express terms of the policy, was fully justified in its decision to submit the plaintiffs’ claims to an appraiser.

Arias v. Geisinger, 126 Conn. App. 860 (2011):
(Pellegrino, J.)  Connecticut law provides that if an employee is injured as a result of the negligence of a fellow employee, no worker’s compensation action may be brought by the injured employee for recovery against that employee unless the injuries were caused by the fellow employee’s willful or malicious act or the action is based on the fellow employee’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle.  The plaintiff, Juan Arias, sought to recover damages from the defendant, a fellow employee, for negligence when the rear passenger side door of a cargo container that was being moved by a vehicle the defendant was driving struck a wooden beam that supported a canopy under which the plaintiff was working.  The beam was dislodged and struck the plaintiff.  At that time, both parties were working within the scope of their employment.  Although the parties stipulated that the defendant was negligent, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff was statutorily precluded from recovery for his injuries based on the aforementioned law.  The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the defendant’s negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, which is an exception to the general rule.

KJC Real Estate Development, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 127 Conn. App. 16 (2011):
(Beach, J.)  The plaintiff filed a request for zoning permits to build and to divide its parcel of property into two lots and the zoning enforcement officer denied that request.  The defendant zoning board of appealed upheld that denial and the plaintiff appealed to the trial court.  The trial court dismissed the appeal and, upon the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court.  The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court properly determined that under the applicable zoning regulations, the lot had to have frontage on a public street before zoning permits could be issued and that the lot in question abutted a street that was not a public street.  Although the plaintiff continued to have a private right of access over that street, the public right of travel over the road was terminated when the road was statutorily discontinued in 1968.

Nelson v. The Contracting Group, LLC, 127 Conn. App. 45 (2011):
(Robinson, J.)  The plaintiff filed suit for damages stemming from the alleged wrongful termination of his employment with the defendant.  The defendant failed to appear and was defaulted; thereafter a hearing in damages was held and the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff.  The trial court subsequently denied the defendant’s motion to open the judgment and the defendant appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court was properly within its discretion when it denied the defendant’s motion to open the judgment.  The defendant’s mistaken belief regarding an agreement between counsel, which the defendant asserted as an excuse for failing to appear, was an insufficient reason to open the judgment in light of the facts that, inter alia, the defendant had notice of the action, had knowledge that the plaintiff was moving forward with the litigation, had notice of a motion for default for failure to appear, and nevertheless waited approximately one year after the trial court granted the motion for default to file an appearance.

Connecticut Supreme Court

Connecticut National Bank v. Rehab Associates, 300 Conn. 314 (2011):
(Eveleigh, J.) The plaintiff bank had a deficiency judgment entered in its favor in 1991.  It later entered into an agreement with the owners of the defendant company to accept a portion of the amount of the judgment as “payment in full of the indebtedness.”  The bank later assigned its rights, if any, in the deficiency judgment to the Cadle Company, who thereafter sought to have the defendants pay the judgment in full.  The trial court held that the agreement did not satisfy the deficiency judgment, but the Supreme Court reversed.  The Court held that the term “indebtedness” as used in the agreement clearly and unambiguously included the deficiency judgment.  Further, had the sophisticated bank wanted to limit the agreement to exclude the judgment or any judgment debtors, it could have done so.  As such, the agreement included the judgment and the defendant debtors, and Cadle Company did not have a claim against the defendants for payment on the deficiency judgment.

Lighthouse Landings, Inc. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 300 Conn. 325 (2011):
(Per Curiam) The plaintiff and defendant had a lease agreement, which the defendant terminated after the plaintiff breached a provision of the lease.  After much litigation, the Supreme Court initially held that the lease was properly terminated, and remanded the case.  On remand, the defendant motioned for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by collateral estoppel.  However, the trial court only granted summary judgment in part, holding that the plaintiff’s misrepresentation and CUTPA claims were not barred by collateral estoppel and allowed the plaintiff to proceed on those claims.  On appeal, the Supreme Court here affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The Court agreed that the plaintiff’s claims of breach of lease, breach of good faith and fair dealing and promissory estoppel were barred by collateral estoppel.  However, the Court held that the plaintiff’s claims of misrepresentation and CUTPA were not properly litigated after remand, and were instead barred by res judiciata because they were raised and fully litigated prior to the initial remand. 
Palmer, J., dissenting.  The misrepresentation and CUTPA claims were not barred by either collateral estoppel or res judicata.  Res judicata does not apply first because the prior action was solely to seek declaratory relief, and does not bar a subsequent action for injunctive relief.  Second, because the parties agreed to stay the prior action pending the resolution of subsequent litigation, the outcome of the subsequent litigation has no preclusive effect on the stayed action.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Douglas v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 127 Conn. App. 87 (2011):
(Flynn, J.) The defendant commission amended a zoning ordinance to allow retail and office development in a zone that was limited to industrial use.  The plaintiffs sought to challenge the amendment, but the trial court dismissed their suit for lack of standing.  The Appellate Court reversed  in part, holding that those plaintiffs who owned land within 100 feet of the new zoning district created by the amendment had standing to challenge the amendment under Conn. Gen. Stat. §8-8(a)(1), and their claims were improperly dismissed.  The trial court was proper in dismissing those claims of plaintiffs who owned land outside that 100-foot radius though, because their claims were based solely on environmental harm under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-19.  The Court held that the only proper challenge they could bring was an appeal from a zoning decision creating an exception or approving a site plan, following precedent set in Pond View, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 288 Conn. 143 (2008).  Because the plaintiffs instead alleged environmental damage due to the zoning amendment and their properties were not located within the 100-foot radius, their claims were properly dismissed.

Spitz v. Board of Examiners of Psychologists, 127 Conn. App. 108 (2011):
(Alvord, J.) The plaintiff appealed a trial court decision upholding the suspension of his license by the board of examiners of psychologists for a violation of an ethical code.  The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court.  Because the board’s decision was a result of an administrative hearing, the Court reviewed their actions to determine if the board acted “unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.”  The Court held that the plaintiff was afforded ample notice of the claims of misconduct, fulfilling due process requirements.  Further, the plaintiff did not adequately prove his claim that the board members were biased against him.  The trial court also properly declined to reverse the board’s decision based solely on its FOIA violation, as the plaintiff had been provided relief in a separate action for the board’s FOIA violation.  Lastly, the trial court properly found that there was substantial evidence to support the board’s findings and conclusions.

Anatra v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 127 Conn. App. 125 (2011):
(Bear, J.) The plaintiffs applied to the town’s zoning officer for a permit to build a deck attached to their house, for which they had already received zoning variances.  The officer denied the application, and the zoning board affirmed, holding that they would have to modify their zoning variances to obtain the deck permit.  The superior court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal, but the Appellate Court reversed.  Because the deck itself would not require a zoning variance (as it complied with all zoning regulations), the plaintiffs did not need to modify the variances associated with their house to obtain a permit.  Additionally, the original house-related variances had no restriction on or mention of the building of a deck.  Therefore, the permit could be issued without the modification. 
Gruendel, J., concurring.  It is very important that a zoning board clearly enunciate any and all conditions in granting a variance, and only those conditions clearly contained in the variance can be later used to deny a permit.  The concurring opinion pointedly addresses prior Supreme and Appellate Court precedent that the defendant used to argue that denial was proper, but explains why the cases do not hold in the defendant’s favor.

Clark v. Clark, 127 Conn. App. 148 (2011):
(Bishop, J.) The defendant wife appealed the judgment of dissolution and various financial and custody orders.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment in part, and reversed in part.  The Court held that the trial court did not improperly fail to order specific treatment around New York City for the parties’ special needs child.  Further, despite the wife’s argument that retaining the Florida home would allow her child to receive more affordable treatment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the home’s sale to allow a more equitable distribution of assets.  The trial court also properly considered the special needs of the child in fashioning its child support order, in compliance with the guidelines.  The court specifically stated that the “child who requires additional care will require a significant expenditure of funds.”  The court also did not err in holding the parties equally responsible for fees of the guardian ad litem and attorney for the minor child, as the evidence showed that each party was financially able to afford the fees.  Lastly, the court did err in not incorporating the pendente lite support arrearage into the final award.  However, because the arrearage did not relate to the other financial orders, the Appellate Court did not remand for a reconsideration of all financial orders, but merely remanded so that the trial court could determine the amount of pendent lite support arrearage to be included in the final judgment.

Cadle Co. v. Clark, 127 Conn. App. 160 (2011):
(Beach, J.) The defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of her motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered against her.  Her first claim was that the plaintiff did not properly serve other defendants in the case.  Because the defendant was not personally harmed by the improper service, and because she herself was not improperly served, however, the trial court properly denied the motion to open on those grounds.  Secondly, she claimed that the trial court ignored her evidence as to the value of the property, and valued the property much lower than her evidence showed.  The Appellate Court, however, affirmed the trial court, finding that its valuation was supported by evidence in the record.

Yellow Cab Co. of New London & Groton, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 127 Conn. App. 170 (2011):
(West, J.) The plaintiffs intervened and appealed a decision of the defendant department to allow a third party cab company to operate two additional cabs in the same geographical area where the plaintiffs operate.  The department granted the cab permits, and the plaintiffs appealed that decision.  The original applicant was given notice of the appeal and further hearings, but did not participate in the same.  The trial court sustained the plaintiffs’ appeal, and the applicant then motioned to open the judgment and moved to dismissed the trial court’s decision.  Both motions were denied, and the applicant appealed to the Appellate Court.  The Court affirmed the denial of the motions, since the applicant had notice and opportunity to participate in the administrative appeal, but did not.  Further, nothing prejudicial occurred in the administrative appeal prior to the applicant being given notice of the same.

In re Alison M., 127 Conn. App. 197 (2011):
(DiPentima, C.J.) The respondent mother had a history of mental health issues and substance abuse.  The petitioner DCF had the mother’s children committed to their care for approximately two and one-half years before the termination petition was granted by the trial court.  The court found that, despite DCF’s reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with her children, she was not able to demonstrate that she had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation.  The mother appealed, but the Appellate Court disagreed with the mother’s claims, and affirmed the termination.  The Court declined to review the mother’s claim that she did not benefit from services, because she did not challenge DCF’s efforts as unreasonable, which is required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-112(j).   The court’s finding that the mother was barely able to care for herself, let alone her children, was appropriate support to properly conclude that she had not achieved a sufficient level of rehabilitation and that termination was in the best interests of the child.  Further, as to the mother’s claim that the children’s grandmother was improperly allowed to participate in the adjudicatory phase of the trial, the Court held that abuse of discretion was the proper standard of review, not plenary, as the mother argued.

Connecticut Supreme Court

Shortell v. Cavanagh, 300 Conn. 383 (2011):
(Eveleigh, J.)  The plaintiff patient, David Shortell, brought suit against the defendant dentist after undergoing a dental implant procedure.  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had committed negligence by failing to obtain the plaintiff’s informed consent prior to the procedure because he failed to disclose the significant risks associated with the procedure.  The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to attach to the complaint a written opinion letter of a similar health care provider as required by statute.  The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and, after transferring the appeal to itself, the Supreme Court reversed.  The Court held that the claim of a lack of informed consent is not a medical negligence claim subject to the statutory requirements upon which the motion to dismiss was granted and so no written opinion letter was necessary. 

Keane v. Fischetti, 300 Conn. 395 (2011):
(Zarella, J.)  The plaintiffs in two cases sued to recover damages from the defendant firefighters as a result of a collision between two fire trucks during an emergency call.  They alleged that the defendants were negligent in the operation of the fire trucks involved in the collision.  Pursuant to statute, if a paid or volunteer firefighter is entitled to benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act as a result of death caused by the negligence of a fellow firefighter while they are both engaged in the scope of their employment, the injured firefighter (or in the case of his death, his dependent) shall not have a cause of action against the other firefighter to recover damages for the injury or death unless it was wilful and malicious.  The trial court, in both cases, granted the defendants’ motion to strike on the basis that the plaintiffs’ claims were statutorily barred and entered judgment in their favor.  The plaintiffs had objected to the motions to strike, alleging that the statute violated the equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions, and appealed.  After transferring the appeal to itself, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the statute at issue, which provides immunity to firefighter co-employees for negligent operation of vehicles, does not violate the equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Gillespie v. Jenkins, 127 Conn. App. 228 (2011):
(Beach, J.)  The trial court granted the defendant ex-wife’s motion to open and to modify the judgment that awarded the parties joint legal custody of their minor child, with primary physical custody awarded to the defendant.  The trial court, in granting the motion to open, designated the defendant as primary caretaker of the child and gave her primary decision-making authority over all questions involving the child’s well-being health, schooling and extracurricular activities.  The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court, holding that the motion was improperly granted because there was no testimony or other evidence from which it could have found that a material change in circumstances existed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion for modification because the court had before it the defendant’s testimony that she intended to retire and that that retirement constituted a change in circumstances allowing her more time to deal with the child’s needs.  The trial court thus properly determined that it was in the best interest of the child to give the defendant primary decision-making authority.

Culver v. Culver, 127 Conn. App. 236 (2011):
(Borden, J.)  Horton, Shields & Knox represented the defendant ex-husband in his appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting relief requested in a postjudgment motion for contempt filed by the ex-wife.  The plaintiff had alleged that the defendant had failed to comply with his child support obligation.  The trial court entered judgment requiring the defendant to pay past-due child support, denying the defendant’s requested equitable relief, and awarding attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that (1) the oral agreement between the parties, which provided for the defendant to pay for the children’s private school in exchange for being relieved of his monthly child support obligations, was unenforceable; (2) the plaintiff was not equitably estopped from seeking past-due child support; (3) the plaintiff was not unjustly enriched by the defendant’s payment of the children’s private school expenses; and (4) the plaintiff was entitled to attorneys’ fees.

Kumah v. Brown, 127 Conn. App. 254 (2011):
(Gruendel, J.)  The plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Kumah, sued, inter alia, the town of Greenwich for personal injuries sustained by Mr. Kumah when his vehicle collided with a fire truck that was parked diagonally across the center and right lanes of an interstate highway while the driver of the fire truck was responding to a tractor trailer accident.  The plaintiffs claimed that the town was negligent and careless because the fire truck and lane closures were marked inadequately and that the positioning of the fire truck constituted a nuisance.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motions to strike the negligence and nuisance counts of the plaintiffs’ complaint and the plaintiffs appealed.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the court had improperly granted the defendant’s motion to strike the negligence counts on the basis of governmental immunity, which does not shield towns for the negligent performance of ministerial duties.  The Appellate Court also held that the trial court improperly granted the motion to strike the nuisance counts because the court had improperly determined that the municipal highway defect statute provided the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs’ claims.

Brule v. Nerac, Inc., 127 Conn. App. 315 (2011):
(Stoughton, J.)  The plaintiffs, former employees of the defendant corporate employer, brought suit against the defendant and five individual employees of the defendant after having their employment terminated.  The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, breach of express of implied employment contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence.  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had contractually binding obligations not to terminate its managing employees without first affording progressive discipline.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to strike one of the plaintiff’s contract-based claims and all negligence claims against the individual defendants and, later, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims.  The plaintiffs appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the representations made during the defendant’s management training course were not promissory in nature and not contractually binding.  The Court also held that in the absence of a duty for the defendant to use progressive discipline and to provide an opportunity for the plaintiffs to improve before terminating their employment, the plaintiffs could not recover for negligence.

McCarthy v. Chromium Process Co., 127 Conn. App. 324 (2011):
(Beach, J.)  The plaintiff, the Commissioner of Environmental Protection, sought temporary and injunctive relief requiring the defendant business to comply with the terms of the environmental permits it had obtained in connection with its discharge of metal finishing wastewater.  The trial court entered a stipulated judgment providing for injunctive relief, imposing monetary penalties, and providing for stipulated penalties for postjudgment violations of injunctions.  The plaintiff filed a motion for assessment of stipulated penalties, but the court stayed the matter after an evidentiary hearing because the company filed a bankruptcy petition.  The court then granted the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the bankruptcy stay, lifted the stay, assessed penalties and ordered the defendant to surrender its permits.  The defendant appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the court had properly assessed financial penalties in the amount of $25,000 for each of four violations of the stipulated judgment.  The Court also declined to review the defendant’s secondary claim regarding the stipulated judgment because the court’s decision contained no specific finding on that claim and the defendant failed to file a motion for an articulation.

Budahazy v. Budahazy, 127 Conn. App. 362 (2011):
(Per Curiam.)  The defendant ex-husband appealed from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff ex-wife.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, finding that the defendant did not sustain his burden with respect to any of the eight issues he raised in his appeal.

In re Mia M., 127 Conn. App. 363 (2011):
(Lavine, J.)  The respondent mother appealed from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor child.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court properly terminated the respondent’s parental rights based on its findings regarding her serious and long-standing mental illness and her failure to sufficiently rehabilitate.  The Court also concluded that the trial court properly determined that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate the respondent’s parental rights.

Connecticut Supreme Court

None.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Robert J. Barnabei Contracting, LLC v. Greater Hartford Jewish Community Center, Inc., 127 Conn. App. 507 (2011):
(Gruendel, J.)  The plaintiff, a subcontractor, sued to recover damages from the defendant general contractor for breach of a contract they had entered into with the purpose of renovating a community center.  The case was referred to an attorney fact finder, whose report recommended judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $292 in compensatory damages.  The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with that report and the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the attorney fact finder did not clearly err in finding that the price for the subcontract was not adjusted upwards and that the cost of an engineering firm’s services was appropriately backcharged to the plaintiff.  In addition, the Court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant failed to comply with the contract’s written notice provision was not adequately preserved for appellate review.

Bock v. Bock, 127 Conn. App. 553 (2011):
(Beach, J.)  After the dissolution of the parties’ marriage, the plaintiff ex-husband had filed a motion to modify the parties’ educational support agreement, seeking to reduce his required payments.  The defendant ex-wife filed a postjudgment motion for contempt in response.  The trial court dismissed both motions for lack of jurisdiction and the defendant appealed, claiming that the educational support agreements were validly entered into and that the trial court improperly concluded that they were not validly incorporated by reference into the dissolution decree.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the parties’ agreements were not valid educational support orders under C.G.S. § 46b-56c.

Blass v. Rite Aid of Connecticut, Inc., 127 Conn. App. 569 (2011):
(Harper, J.)  The plaintiff, a customer, filed a class action lawsuit alleging improper collection of sales tax by the defendant in violation of a variety of statutes including the Sales and Use Taxes Act.  She claimed that the defendant charged her a sales tax based on the pre-coupon sales price for various purchased items.  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.  The plaintiff appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that (1) the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and (2) the plaintiff lacked an independent cause of action pursuant to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act.

Boulanger v. Old Lyme, 127 Conn. App. 572 (2011):
(Per Curiam.)  The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants, the town of Old Lyme and its First Selectment, claiming that the defendant’s repeated refusal to allow the plaintiffs to use their property as a public parking lot violated their constitutional rights.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiffs appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, adopting that court’s well-reasoned memorandum of decision.

Krystyna v. Janusz W., 127 Conn. App. 586 (2011):
(Alvord, J.)  The plaintiff-wife filed an application for a restraining order pursuant to C.G.S. § 46b-15, asking for protection from abuse by the defendant-husband for herself, their minor son and their adult daughter.  After a hearing, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s application, ordering the defendant to stay away from the family’s house, to attend alcohol abuse counseling, and to refrain from contact with the plaintiff and the children for six months.  The defendant appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the court properly entered the domestic violence restraining order against the defendant and that the court did not exceed its statutory authority when ordering the defendant to attend alcohol abuse counseling.

Knox v. Smith, 127 Conn. App. 593 (2011):
(Gruendel, J.)  The plaintiff commenced arbitration proceedings against the defendant pursuant to the parties’ operating agreement and alleged, inter alia, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.  After a hearing, the arbitrator awarded the plaintiff approximately $325,000 plus interest.  The defendants thereafter filed an amended application to vacate that arbitration award, challenging the arbitrator’s interpretation and analysis of the evidence presented during and after the arbitration hearings.  The trial court denied the defendants’ amended application and rendered judgment confirming the award in favor of the plaintiff.  The defendants appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the arbitrator did not exhibit a manifest disregard of the law in finding for the plaintiff.

Santos v. Morrissey, 127 Conn. App. 602 (2011):
(Per Curiam.)  The plaintiff-father filed a motion for modification of an existing visitation order concerning his minor child.  The trial court denied that motion and the plaintiff appealed.  While the appeal was pending, the defendant-mother filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot because the trial court issued an order on a new motion for modification of visitation and custody filed by the plaintiff.  That new order decided the same issues that the earlier order, from which the plaintiff had appealed, did.  As such, the Appellate Court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal as moot because there was no practical relief that the Court could afford the plaintiff.