Connecticut Supreme Court

Coe v. Board of Education, 301 Conn. 112 (2011):
(Per Curiam.)  The plaintiffs, a student and her mother, sued the defendant town, Board of Education, and two teachers, for negligence and indemnification.  The plaintiffs claimed that the student, while at an eighth grade graduation dance sponsored by the Board and held at a private facility, injured her foot by stepping on a shard of glass from a fallen goblet while the student was walking barefoot to the dance floor.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to strike on the basis that the negligence claims were barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity and that there was no basis of an indemnification claim in the absence of a common-law negligence claim.  The Supreme Court, after transferring the appeal to itself, affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that sponsoring the middle school graduation dance at an off-school, private facility constituted a discretionary act for the purposes of governmental immunity.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims were barred.

Connecticut Appellate Court

R&R Pool & Patio, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 129 Conn. App. 275 (2011):
(Bear, J.)  The plaintiff, a commercial tenant, submitted an application for site plan approval to the town Planning Director for the proposed use of certain property for retail sale of outdoor furniture.  The property was located in a zone in which retail uses were not permitted, although the previous tenant had conducted business on the property according to a variance allowing retail and wholesale sale of oriental rugs, fine furniture and art.  The Planning Director denied the plaintiff’s application, and the defendant Zoning Board of Appeals upheld that denial.  The plaintiff appealed, and the trial court reversed the judgment of the Board based on its finding that the Board’s definition of “fine furniture” in the certificate of variance was arbitrary and illegal and had no relation to the use of the property approved by the Board at the time of the original variance.  The defendant appealed.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in part, holding that the defendant’s definition of “fine furniture” was arbitrary and illegal but also the trial court’s definition of “fine furniture” was arbitrary and illegal.  The proper definition of “fine furniture” is high quality furniture, not good quality furniture.  In addition, as a matter of first impression, the Court held that the issue of whether a local zoning board’s interpretation of undefined words or phrases contained in a certificate of zoning variance is entitled to deference depends on whether the words or phrases are ambiguous.   

Total Recycling Services of Connecticut, Inc. v. Connecticut Oil Recycling Services, LLC, 129 Conn. App. 296 (2011):
(Schaller, J.)  The plaintiffs, sellers of an oil recycling business, sued the defendant buyer alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment.  The defendant counterclaimed, seeking damages stemming from the plaintiffs’ alleged failure to honor their obligations under three contracts.  The defendant also sought attorney’s fees in accordance with provisions in two of the contracts allowing attorney’s fees resulting from a breach of contract.  The trial court, following a remand order from the Appellate Court in a previous decision, denied the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and the defendant appealed.  At the hearing on attorney’s fees, the only witness was a trial attorney with many years of experience who testified that sorting out attorney’s fees would be extremely difficult in this matter.  The Appellate Court (Schaller, J.) affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the defendant was not entitled to attorney’s fees where the legal proposition relied on by the defendant flew in the face of well settled law regarding awards of attorney’s fees.

(Beach, J., concurring.)  Judge Beach concurred in the result reached by Justice Schaller, finding that because the record shows that the trial court reasonably could have reached its result, the Court properly affirmed its judgment.

(Alvord, J., dissenting.)  Judge Alvord dissented, noting her position that relevant case law supported the defendant’s claim for attorney’s fees.  Accordingly, she stated that the trial court did not correctly apply the law and could not reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did.

Housing Authority v. Brown, 129 Conn. App. 313 (2011):
(Beach, J.)  The plaintiff, the city Housing Authority, initiated a summary process action for a breach of the lease agreement against the defendant tenant in order to regain possession of the leased premises.  Specifically, one of the authorized occupants of the apartment was arrested and convicted for drug-related conduct.  After first issuing to the defendant a pretermination notice, the plaintiff served on the defendant a notice to quit possession and to vacate the premises.  When the defendant failed to vacate, the plaintiff initiated the summary process action.  The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court had properly determined that the defendant had breached the lease agreement because of the drug-related activity, and that the defendant could not cure her breach of the lease by way of the authorized occupant’s incarceration.

Bubrosky v. Bubrosky, 129 Conn. App. 338 (2011):
(Per Curiam.)  The defendant ex-husband appealed from the judgment dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff ex-wife and ordering him to pay child support and alimony.  The trial court additionally awarded attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff, and the defendant filed an amended appeal.  The plaintiff then filed a motion for contempt, which the trial court granted, and the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the amended appeal, claiming that the defendant’s violation of the court’s financial orders and the parties’ parenting plan demonstrated a pattern of contemptuous conduct in deliberate defiance of numerous court orders.  The Appellate Court agreed and dismissed the appeal.  It found significant the fact that, inter alia, the trial court had issued nine contempt orders against the defendant during the pendency of the appeal.

Moran v. Morneau, 129 Conn. App. 349 (2011):
(Schaller, J.)  The plaintiff filed suit to foreclose a judgment lien on property owned by the defendant.  The trial court rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale and set the sale date for November, 2009.  Five days before the set sale date, the trial court granted one of the defendants’ motion to determine the priorities of the parties with respect to the subject property.  The plaintiff appealed, challenging the trial court’s determination of the parties’ priorities in which the defendant’s interests were given first priority over that of the plaintiff.  Because of the pending appeal, the trial court cancelled the sale.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court’s order determining the priorities of the parties was not an appealable final judgment.  The trial court’s ordering of priorities was interlocutory until a sale was approved and a supplemental judgment rendered.  Finally, the plaintiff could always file an appropriate motion asking the trial court to reconsider the question of priorities after a sale and prior to the rendering of a supplemental judgment.

Iello v. Weiner, 129 Conn. App. 359 (2011):
(Gruendel, J.)  The plaintiff patient sued the defendant dentist and dental practice for dental malpractice.  The plaintiff alleged that the dentist had been negligent in providing postoperative care.  The plaintiff previously had sued the dental practice and a third-party doctor, who also provided postoperative care to the plaintiff, but voluntarily withdrew that action in its entirety.  The plaintiff claimed that although the second action was not brought within the period of the applicable statute of limitations, it was saved by the statute permitting a plaintiff to bring a new action where an earlier action has been dismissed for failure to name the right person.  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the third-party doctor defendant in the first lawsuit was, in fact, a proper defendant for the legal theory of negligence.  Because the plaintiff’s first suit was brought against a “right person,” the untimely second action could not be statutorily saved.

Connecticut Supreme Court

Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 301 Conn. 194 (2011):
(McLachlan, J.) The manager of the airport had cut down approximately 340 trees that were on property bordering the airport, and owned by a land trust, arguing that the trees were a danger to aircraft.  In a total of six different actions, the land trust sued, and the airport filed various counterclaims against them.  Summary judgment was granted in favor of the land trust.  The airport appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the airport’s claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.  The airport could have brought its various claims as part of actions filed previously to the one it did bring its actions as part of.

Connecticut Appellate Court

DPF Financial Holdings, LLC v. Lyons, 129 Conn. App. 380 (2011):
(Schaller, J.) The Appellate Court reversed a compensatory fine issued against the defendant by the trial court.  The Court held that there was no factual support in the record to prove the amount of damages the plaintiff incurred, and therefore, nothing supported the amount of the fine.  The Court remanded for a hearing on damages.  Further, the Court reversed the award of attorney’s fees for the same reason – lack of factual support in the record.  The trial court had not considered any time sheets or other materials to prove the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees.

Savvidis v. Norwalk, 129 Conn. App. 406 (2011):
(Bishop, J.) The Appellate Court held that the plaintiff’s claims for damages stemming from the City’s failure to issue a certificate of occupancy on a rental property the plaintiff owned was barred by res judicata.  The plaintiff could have sought damages in the underlying action that requested a writ of mandamus to compel the City to issue the certificate.  Because he did not seek damages in the first action, his claim was later barred.

Commissioner of Public Safety v. Board of Firearms Permit Examiners, 129 Conn. App. 414 (2011):
(Bishop, J.) The Commissioner revoked the state pistol permit of the defendant McWhorter.  The defendant Board reversed that revocation, and the Commissioner appealed to the superior court.  The superior court dismissed the appeal, and the Commissioner appealed from that dismissal.  The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding that McWhorter was a suitable person to hold a permit.  McWhorter’s permit was initially revoked based on one arrest, which charges were later nolled, in his otherwise law-abiding life.  On appeal, the Board found that those grounds did not meet the standard set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-32b(b).  

Commissioner of Correction v. Freedom of Information Commission, 129 Conn. App. 425 (2011):
(Per Curiam) The Appellate Court dismissed the defendant’s appeal because Public Act 10-58 passed during the pendency of the appeal, rendering it moot.

Highgate Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Miller, 129 Conn. App. 429 (2011):
(Per Curiam) The Appellate Court held that the trial court improperly opened judgment of strict foreclosure after the property had vested absolutely in the plaintiff.  The trial court did not make a specific factual and legal finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and could not properly open the judgment without that finding.   

Taylor v. Lantz, 129 Conn. App. 437 (2011):
(Robinson, J.) The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  The plaintiff was incarcerated, and was placed on various types of restrictive statuses during that time.  He sued members of the department of corrections, alleging that his due process rights were violated when he was placed on restrictive status without notice and a hearing.  The Appellate Court affirmed summary judgment.  The plaintiff’s claim that his rights were violated because he had more restrictive conditions placed on him than other inmates was unfounded, as the plaintiff merely provided an affidavit with bald assertions, but no proof of his claim. Further, the department produced prison directives disproving the plaintiff’s claim.  Second, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that he was entitled to a hearing before being placed on restrictive status.  The restrictive statuses were not based on the plaintiff’s mental health status, despite the plaintiff’s allegations.  Because he did not prove his claims, there was no genuine issue of material fact, and summary judgment was proper.

In re Luciano B., 129 Conn. App. 449 (2011):
(Beach, J.) Horton, Shields & Knox represented the appellant (respondent-father) in this appeal.
Both parents appealed from the termination of their parental rights.  The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that DCF made sufficient efforts to reunify the parents with their child, but that both parents failed to rehabilitate.  Additionally, termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child.

Connecticut Supreme Court

Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542 (2011):
(Zarella, J.) The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s dismissal of her suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The plaintiff challenged a decision of the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission that approved a 7% power uprate in one of the defendant’s units.  The plaintiff sought an injunction, damages, and other relief on the grounds that the uprate would cause unreasonable pollution in Long Island Sound and to an estuary that she owns property near.  The trial court dismissed her complaint for lack of standing.  On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s complaint was not moot because a reversal of the uprate was potentially feasible both financially and technically.  The plaintiff’s claim as to unreasonable pollution for the increase of radioactive waste was properly dismissed, as it was preempted by federal law.  The plaintiff’s claim as to unreasonable pollution for the increase in the temperature of the thermal plume was properly dismissed for lack of standing.  The plaintiff did not allege “substantive” violations that caused unreasonable pollution, as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-16.  Her public nuisance claim was also properly dismissed for lack of standing, as her claim alleged general, global statements of harm without distinguishing how she would be personally harmed.

Alexandre v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 300 Conn. 566 (2011):
(Norcott, J.) The plaintiff was audited, and as part of the audit, submitted “Z reports,” which were cash register receipt tapes that included only the date, sequence number, and the cumulative amount of cash run through the register.  The Court affirmed the trial court, in holding that the Z reports did not satisfy the plaintiff’s obligation to keep proper taxpayer records under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-426 and §12-2-12 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.  The Z reports were not properly substituted for detailed cash register tapes because they did not provide documentation of individual sales or transactions, as required by the statute and regulation.

Connecticut Motor Cars v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 300 Conn. 617 (2011): (McLachlan, J.) The Court held that § 14-63-36c(c) does not allow a licensed motor vehicle dealer or repairer to charge a “gate fee” in addition to a regular towing fee.  The plaintiffs here charged a “gate fee” to people whose cards they had towed to bring the car from their secured storage area to the area where the owner could retrieve the car.  After complaints were filed with the department of motor vehicles, a hearing was held, and the hearing officer determined that these “gate fees” were supposed to be included in the towing fees, per § 14-63-36c of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.  The plaintiff appealed, and the trial court affirmed the decision.  The Supreme Court further affirmed, holding that the term “tow charge” as used in the Regulations includes all the activities for which the “gate fee” was charged, and therefore, the that extra “gate fee” was improperly charged.

 HVT, Inc. v. Law, 300 Conn. 623 (2011):
(Norcott, J.) The Supreme Court held that vehicle registration renewal fees on leased cars qualify as part of a lessor’s “gross receipts” subject to sales tax under § 12-408(1), and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  The Court relied in part on the lease agreements, which provided that the renewal fees, paid by the lessees of the cars, “are part of the gross receipts attributable to the lease and are therefore subject to sales tax.”  They also interpreted the statute and look to the history of receipts subject to sales tax.  Because the responsibility of paying the renewal fee is solely on the owner of the car, and not the lessee of the car, the payments made by the lessees directly were not reimbursements to the lessor.   The lessees’ payments of the renewal fees instead directly benefitted the lessor financially because it relieved the lessor of its obligation to pay the fees.  As such, it is properly considered part of the lessor’s gross receipts.
Eveleigh, J., Dissenting.  The payment of the renewal fees does not count toward taxable gross receipts because it does not benefit the lessor.  Because the payments are not part of the sale and were never due from the lessees to the lessor to begin with, it does not benefit the lessor financially, and should not be interpreted to be taxable under the statute.

Piteau v. Board of Education, 300 Conn. 667 (2011):
(Palmer, J.) The plaintiff was disciplined at work, filed a grievance, and participated in arbitration, which resulted in an unfavorable outcome to him.  Thereafter, the plaintiff instituted the present action claiming that the board of education had breached its collective bargaining agreement by not providing fair representation during the arbitration proceedings.  The board filed a motion to dismiss because the plaintiff had not brought a complaint with the state board of labor relations.  The Supreme Court held that the trial court properly dismissed the action on these grounds, as exhaustion of his administrative remedies was required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-468(d).  The state board of labor relations had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims and would have been able to overturn the arbitration award and reinstate the plaintiff to his former position, had those remedies been appropriate.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Mirjavadi v. Vakilzadeh, 127 Conn. App. 61 (2011):
(Lavine, J.) The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s decision in favor of the defendant.  The plaintiff had hired the defendant to supervise her daughter’s visits with the father of the child.  The plaintiff and the father were divorced, and the father was only allowed supervised visits.  At one of these visits, the father kidnapped the child and brought the child to Turkey, while she was supposed to be under the defendant’s supervision.  The Appellate Court reversed the finding for the defendant, and remanded for a new trial.  The Court held that the trial court erroneously found some critical facts in the case, which errors were harmful, and that because of the errors in fact finding, the decision could not stand.

Sierra v. C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 127 Conn. App. 78 (2011):
(Bishop, J.) The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the compensation review board, which affirmed the workers compensation commissioner in denying benefits for a 50% impairment to the claimant’s abdominal wall.  The abdominal wall is not a scheduled body part in § 31-308(b), but a commissioner has discretion to accept or deny a claim for unscheduled body parts.  Here, the commissioner did not err in rejecting the claim, as he found the medical evidence to be lacking.

Caltabiano v. L & L Real Estate Holdings II, LLC, 127 Conn. App. 84 (2011):
(Harper, J.) The Appellate Court held that a judgment of nonsuit was properly rendered after the plaintiffs failed to file a substitute revised amended complaint that was responsive to the court’s orders upon striking the amended complaint.  The substitute complaint was materially identical to the amended complaint stricken by the trial court. 

Horenian v. Washington, 127 Conn. App. 91 (2011):
(Lavery, J.) The plaintiff sued the defendant police officer and the police department for which the defendant worked for emotional distress and abuse of process in relation to an investigation of a car accident in which the plaintiff was involved.  The plaintiff was found at fault for the accident, but all charges against him were nolled.  The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants.  On appeal, the Appellate Court held that a portion of the plaintiff’s appeal was moot.  The plaintiff appealed in part on the grounds that the trial court erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact, when the court had also based its decision granting summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds.  The appeal on this issue was moot, as the plaintiff did not appeal both grounds for granting summary judgment.  Further, the plaintiff appealed the granting of summary judgment arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the officer’s conduct was not extreme and outrageous, as required to successfully claim a case of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The Appellate Court held that the trial court properly interpreted the evidence, and did not err in finding a lack of extreme and outrageous conduct.  The Court affirmed the decision granting summary judgment.

Vance v. Tassmer, 127 Conn. App. 101 (2011):
(Alvord, J.) The parties entered into an agreement regarding a shared boundary line between their properties, whereby the plaintiffs would obtain a portion of the defendant’s property by adverse possession after certain conditions outlined in the agreement were met.  The plaintiffs later sought to have the agreement enforced.  The Appellate Court held that the agreement was enforceable, as the language was not ambiguous and that the plaintiffs pursued a variance, as required by the agreement, in good faith.  Further, the trial court did not err in finding that the defendants did not act in good faith in pursuing a variance.  The Court found that the evidence did weigh toward the trial court’s findings.  The Appellate Court reversed in part, however, because the trial court did err in awarding the subject property to the plaintiffs.  The Court found that certain contingencies in the agreement were not met, and under the terms of the agreement, the property was not rightfully transferred to the plaintiffs until those contingencies were met.

Rostad v. Hirsch, 127 Conn. App. 119 (2011):
(Peters, J.) After a paternity action concluded that the defendant was the father of the plaintiff’s child, the plaintiff was awarded over $180,000 in attorneys’ fees among the various members of her litigation team.  The defendant appealed the award.  The Appellate Court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, holding that the trial court's pendente lite fee award was a final judgment under the Curcio test.  The Court also found that the awards for the plaintiff’s second and third attorneys were an abuse of discretion, as both attorneys were not licensed in Connecticut, not experienced in paternity matters, and had lined up local counsel.  Only a nominal fee award would have been appropriate.

PIC Associates, LLC v. Greenwich Place GL Acquisition, LLC, 127 Conn. App. 151 (2011):
(Lavine, J.) In a commercial summary process action, the Court held that the defendant was negligent, but not grossly negligent, in failing to pay rent and in failing to bond off mechanics liens placed on the leased property.  This allowed the defendant to prove its special defense of nonforfeiture.  This was further evidenced by the fact that the plaintiff contributed to the defendant’s late bonding off of the mechanics liens, in that the plaintiff did not respond to the defendant’s letter providing the plaintiff with a surety bond.

Community Renewal Team, Inc. v. United States Liability Ins. Co., 127 Conn. App. 174 (2011):
(Borden, J.) The defendant insurance company was sued for its failure to defend a personal injury claim brought against the plaintiff, who was insured by the defendant.  The insurance contract excluded any bodily injury sustained while participating in any athletic activity.  The Appellate Court held that the policy unambiguously excluded the injuries sustained by the person who sued the plaintiff.  The injured person was participating in a “challenge course,” part of which required her to “ascend to an elevated platform and perform a free fall with a rope.”  This is what she was doing when she was injured.  The trial court found, and the Appellate Court affirmed, that this was participation in an athletic activity and coverage was excluded from the insurance policy.

Traylor v. State, 127 Conn. App. 182 (2011):
(Per Curiam) The trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s application for a writ of mandamus, as he failed to show that no other specific adequate remedy would have been available to him to have the court’s actions reviewed.  Further, mandamus was not warranted because the review sought in the application is available on appeal when a final judgment is rendered. 

In re Anvahnay S., 127 Conn. App. 186 (2011):
(DiPentima, C.J.) The father appealed the termination of his parental rights arguing that the trial court erroneously found that DCF had made reasonable efforts and erroneously found that he failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation.  The Appellate Court affirmed the termination, holding that DCF had made reasonable efforts.  Given the father’s incarceration and his failure to communicate with DCF, the department made reasonable efforts, although more could have been done.  Further, evidence indicated that the father lacked the ability or willingness to be a parent to his child.  He failed to rehabilitate in that he did not seek out or take advantage of any of the programs available to him to further his rehabilitation.

Connecticut Supreme Court

None.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 129 Conn. App. 481 (2011):
(Bear, J.)  The plaintiffs, the insured and her husband, sued the defendant, their auto insurer, to recover underinsured motorist benefits due to them under an automobile insurance policy.  The plaintiff-wife had been involved in a car accident that was the result of the negligence of another driver, who had paid the plaintiffs a $25,000 settlement.  The defendant filed a special defense and a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff’s action was barred as untimely because it was filed after the three-year statute of limitations and three-year limit under the policy had expired.  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that, as the underinsured, the plaintiffs had not notified the defendant in writing before the expiration of the three-year period of their claim for underinsured motorist coverage and that they had filed suit less than 180 days after the expiration of the policy’s liability limits.  The plaintiffs appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that summary judgment was properly granted because the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that their claim involved an underinsured motor vehicle and therefore that the three-year statute of limitations period was tolled on the plaintiff’s claim for underinsured motorist benefits.  The Court also held that the defendant would not be equitably stopped from raising the expiration of the three-year limitations period as a defense to the plaintiffs’ claim.  The Court quickly disposed of the plaintiffs’ additional two claims regarding the validity of the tolling provision in the policy and the defendant’s alleged breach of contract.

Wiegand v. Wiegand, 129 Conn. App. 526 (2011):
(Bear, J.)  The plaintiff ex-husband appealed from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the defendant ex-wife.  On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant and her live-in friend violated the automatic orders by disposing of various items of the plaintiff’s personal property and that the trial court improperly denied the plaintiff a full opportunity to question the live-in friend about the disposal of those items.  The plaintiff additionally claimed that the trial court was prejudiced against him during the hearing and that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award the plaintiff alimony.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that, with regard to the plaintiff’s first claim, he could not prevail because he had never filed a motion for contempt for the alleged violation of the automatic orders and that the record did not contain any findings by the trial court with regard to the disposal of the plaintiff’s personal property.  As such, the trial court was within its broad discretion in crediting the testimony of the defendant’s live-in friend that the items were moldy and needed to be disposed.  In addition, the Court held that the trial court’s questions and statements during the dissolution hearing was impartial and meant to keep the plaintiff focused on relevant evidence, and that there was no evidence of bias in the record.  Finally, the Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the plaintiff alimony because, at the time of the dissolution hearing, the plaintiff had little or no income while the defendant had a net income of approximately $889 weekly, and the trial court did not make any findings with regard to the plaintiff’s prospects for employment or his earning capacity.

Denny v. Tomei, 129 Conn. App. 544 (2011):
(Peters, J.)  The plaintiff neighbor, who owned property sharing a border with the defendants’ land but which was not part of the same subdivision, sued the defendants, seeking a declaratory judgment that the plaintiff and the town had a right to build a road on a portion of the land that had been dedicated for future highway use in a previously recorded subdivision map.  The trial court dismissed the action for lack of standing and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that as a landowner whose property abutted the reserved strip of land, he was classically aggrieved by the defendants’ threat to sue him in order to block his ability to build a road there.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court properly dismissed the action because the plaintiff lacked standing.  Specifically, the plaintiff conceded that he did not have statutory standing and he did not challenge the trial court’s finding that he lacked standing because his property was not part of the original recorded subdivision.

New Breed Logistics, Inc. v. CT INDY NH TT, LLC, 129 Conn. App. 563 (2011):
(Lavine, J.)  The plaintiff, who was in a commercial lease with the predecessor of the defendant to rent a portion of land on which three buildings were located, sued to enjoin the defendant from leasing one of the buildings to another tenant.  The defendant claimed that the plaintiff had violated the lease by installing a fence around the building it rented.  The plaintiff then sought a temporary injunction to prevent the defendant from removing the fence, which the trial court granted.  A different trial court thereafter granted the defendant’s motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the court had failed to consider the CUTPA violation alleged by the plaintiff in its complaint.  The  Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court was not required to consider CUTPA in determining whether to dissolve the temporary injunction, and that the plaintiff had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating irreparable harm from the defendant’s removal of the fence.

Jones v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 129 Conn. App. 575 (2011):
(Gruendel, J.)  The plaintiff doctor was disciplined with a fine and probation by the defendant Medical Examining Board for violation of the standard of care regarding his diagnosis and treatment of an infectious disease in two children.  The plaintiff appealed to the trial court, which rendered judgment sustaining the appeal in part, and the plaintiff appealed again.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the plaintiff’s right to due process was not violated with respect to the adequacy of the notice provided of the charges against him.  The Court also held that the plaintiff’s due process right to an impartial tribunal was not violated simply because panel members have opinions regarding the appropriate standards of practice.  The trial court properly found that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate actual bias.  Finally, the Court held that the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof governed revocation proceedings, not the clear and convincing standard, as the plaintiff argued.

Selby v. Building Group, Inc., 129 Conn. App. 599 (2011):
(Per Curiam.)  The plaintiff, in a dispute over a home purchase contract, moved to confirm an arbitration award issued in their favor.  The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the award was untimely issued and therefore of no legal effect.  The plaintiffs were subsequently awarded damages against the defendants.  They then moved to recover from the arbitrator $2500 in arbitration fees that they had paid him.  The trial court denied the motion and the plaintiffs appealed.  The Appellate Court, sua sponte, ordered that the arbitrator be made a party to the appeal.  The Court subsequently affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the arbitrator, a nonparty at the trial proceeding, to return the fees that the plaintiffs had paid him.

In re Kiara R., 129 Conn. App. 604 (2011):
(Beach, J.)  The respondent mother filed an emergency motion to restore her unsupervised visitation with her minor child.  The child had been adjudicated neglected and committed to the custody and care of the Department of Children and Families.  DCF and the respondent were in the process of revoking commitment and reuniting the respondent with her child when she filed the emergency motion.  The trial court heard argument on the motion and ultimately did not issue orders regarding visitation.  Instead, the court referred the matter to DCF for an administrative hearing on the permanent placement plan for the child.  The respondent appealed and, during the pendency of the appeal, the trial court granted the mother’s motion to revoke commitment and reunited the child with the respondent under protective supervision.  The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal for mootness and held that the respondent’s appeal did not fall under the exception to the mootness doctrine for issues capable of repetition yet evading review.