Connecticut Supreme Court

Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton, 299 Conn. 405 (2011):
(Eveleigh, J.)  The plaintiff, the Statewide Grievance Committee, filed a presentment complaint against the defendant, a disbarred attorney, based on conduct by the defendant predating her disbarment.  The defendant had written a letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court accusing three trial court judges of judicial corruption.  The plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s conduct had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct pertaining to false statements and conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice: 8.2 (a) and 8.4 (a).  The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the presentment on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to establish its case by clear and convincing evidence.  The defendant then, as a part of her defense, attempted to subpoena as witnesses two of the judges whom she had accused of impropriety.  The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to quash those subpoenas.  At the end of trial, the trial court entered judgment disbarring the defendant from the practice of law in this state and prohibiting her from applying for reinstatement for five years after she satisfied all of the conditions of reinstatement.  The defendant appealed.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the defendant’s letter constituted misconduct, that she was not entitled to call as witnesses the judges accused of impropriety, that she had failed to establish that the trial court was biased, that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case, and that the defendant was not improperly subjected to duplicative discipline.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Reizfeld v. Reizfeld, 125 Conn. App. 782 (2011):
(Gruendel, J.)  The defendant ex-husband appealed from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff ex-wife.  He claimed on appeal that the trial court improperly awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees, deviated from the child support guidelines, and ordered that the plaintiff be allowed to reside in the defendant’s home rent and expense free for approximately six months following the dissolution of their marriage.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in part, holding that the trial court had improperly awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees because the prenuptial agreement between the parties unambiguously precluded the plaintiff from seeking the payment of her attorney’s fees.  The Court affirmed other aspects of the trial court’s judgment, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either setting the defendant’s child support obligation to $240 per week or in requiring the defendant to pay 70 percent of the unreimbursed medical and child care costs for the parties’ minor children.  The Court also concluded that the defendant’s claim as to the plaintiff’s continued use of the defendant’s home was, if anything, harmless error because the defendant failed to provide any evidence of the value of the home.  Finally, on the plaintiff’s cross appeal, the Court held that the trial court properly determined that the parties’ prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable.

Sargent v. Sargent, 125 Conn. App. 824 (2011):
(Gruendel, J.)  The plaintiff wife and defendant husband, who had previously divorced after five years of marriage, remarried and thirteen years later, the plaintiff filed a complaint for legal separation.  The parties then executed a separation agreement requiring the defendant to pay alimony to the wife.  The defendant thereafter petitioned for dissolution of the marriage and brought a motion for modification of alimony.  After the trial court dissolved the parties’ marriage and granted the defendant’s motion, the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court clearly erred when it found that, at the time of the hearing on the defendant’s petition and motion to modify, it cost the husband $777 per month to include the plaintiff on his medical coverage.  Because the court’s calculation constituted clear error, there was no other evidentiary basis on which the defendant’s alimony obligation should have been reduced, and the trial court’s judgment was reversed.

Connecticut Supreme Court

No Supreme Court decisions to report on this week.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Cappo v. Suda, 126 Conn. App. 1 (2011):
(Dupont, J.) The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment for the plaintiffs on their complaint, granting injunctive relief against the defendant’s subdivision of their lot.  The Court found that the subdivision’s restrictive covenant disallowing the building of more than one building plus one garage on each lot was not abandoned.  Specifically, none of the properties in the subdivision had more than one building on them; those with two buildings were neighboring properties.  Further, the fact that the plaintiffs did not provide notice of their suit to either the other owners within the subdivision not seeking to further divide their properties or to the owners of the neighboring properties did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.  The unnoticed owners’ substantive rights and interests would not be affected by an order as to the defendants, so they were not necessarily included in the lawsuit.

Cianci v. Originalwerks, LLC, 126 Conn. App. 18 (2011):
(Lavine, J.) The plaintiff filed an application to have the defendant’s mechanics liens on her house discharged because she claimed the lien was not timely filed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of her application.  The defendant did file the mechanics lien within ninety days of his last service at the plaintiff’s property.  The court held that the defendant's presence on the plaintiff’s property to meet with a supplier and architect regarding construction, even though no work was performed, did constitute the provision of a service to the plaintiff for the purpose of calculating the deadline to file a mechanics lien.

Coss v. Steward, 126 Conn. App. 30 (2011):
(Lavine, J.) The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment for the defendant on their suit for damage to their stone wall caused by the defendant Town of Waterford’s installation of sewers into the plaintiff’s property.  The Appellate Court affirmed the decision, holding that the defendants were not equitably estopped from using a statute of limitations defense, as they notified the plaintiff that they considered the wall to be repaired two months prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.  Additionally, because the plaintiffs did not provide evidence of how they were harmed by the court’s granting of summary judgment after its granting of a protective order as to their discovery requests served on the defendants, the Appellate Court held that the plaintiffs’ due process rights were not violated by that decision.  Further, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s finding of lack of genuine issue of material fact as to the plaintiffs’ other claims on appeal.

In re Dylan C., 126 Conn. App. 71 (2011):
(Lavine, J.) The child’s mother appealed from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights claiming that the trial court erred in finding that she had not achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation and that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that evidence showed by clear and convincing proof that the mother failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation.  While she made some progress toward her issues with domestic violence, she did not overcome those issues to the extent necessary to prove that she could be a responsible parent for Dylan within a reasonable amount of time.  Further, the Court held that the mother’s claim as to ineffective assistance failed because she did not show that she was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency by her attorney.  Further, her own actions and inactions proved that she had not rehabilitated herself sufficiently.

Connecticut Supreme Court

No non-criminal and non-habeas cases released.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Walpole Woodworkers, Inc. v. Manning, 126 Conn. App. 94 (2011):
(Dupont, J.)  The plaintiff, a fence contractor, brought suit against the defendant homeowner to recover the balance due on a contract to install a fence at the defendant’s residence.  After completing the fence, the plaintiff had sought payment from the defendant, who had refused to pay because he alleged his small dog could still escape under the fence.  The plaintiff thereafter installed a free “fix” by adding additional fencing around the bottom of the fence but the defendant continued to refuse to pay the balance due.  After a trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly concluded that (1) the defendant’s conduct constituted bad faith; (2) the plaintiff was entitled to full recovery under the parties’ contract; and (3) the defendant’s attempt to rescind the contract was unavailing.  The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in part and reversed in part, holding that (1) the trial court properly concluded that the homeowner acted in bad faith in raising the Home Improvement Act as a defense, (2) the plaintiff’s failure to including a start and end date in the contract violated the Home Improvement Act; and (3) where the plaintiff violated the Act and the defendant acted in bad faith by raising the Act as a defense, the plaintiff was entitled to recover only the value of the work performed.

Campanelli v. Candlewood Hills Tax District, 126 Conn. App. 135 (2011):
(Bear, J.)  The plaintiffs, neighboring landowners, brought an adverse possession claim against the defendant, a tax district.  The plaintiffs claimed that they had acquired title by adverse possession to a portion of undeveloped property owned by the defendant that was located adjacent to their property.  The trial court entered judgment for the defendant, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to rebut the presumption that the defendant, a quasi-municipal corporation, held its property for public use and was therefore immune from a claim for adverse possession.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiffs had presented insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the defendant’s land was being held for public use.

Marciano v. Kraner, 126 Conn. App. 171 (2011):
(Gruendel, J.)  The plaintiff, the son of the father-homeowner, brought suit against the defendants, an attorney and a law firm, for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.  Specifically, the plaintiff took issue with the attorney’s advice regarding the conveyance of the father’s home to another disabled son.  A jury trial ensued and at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict as to the legal malpractice claim.  At the end of the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on the fiduciary duty claim and the trial court thereafter granted the defendant’s motion to set aside the jury’s verdict.  The plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly determined that, in the absence of expert testimony, he could not prevail in his action for breach of fiduciary duty.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that in the absence of expert testimony regarding the nature of the attorney-client relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant attorney, the plaintiff could not recover for breach of fiduciary duty.

Weyant v. Kristy, 126 Conn. App. 180 (2011):
(Per Curiam.)  The plaintiff was driving her automobile when her car struck the rear passenger’s side of the defendant’s vehicle.  She brought a negligence action against the defendant driver, seeking damages for the injuries she alleged to have sustained because of the accident.  The defendant asserted an affirmative defense of comparative negligence.  After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant.  The plaintiff filed a motion for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied.  The trial court thereafter entered judgment consistent with the jury verdict and the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, reviewing the record before the trial court and concluding that ample evidence supported the jury’s verdict in that the jury reasonably could have reached its verdict.

No opinions to be reported on this week (everything is a criminal case).

Corriveau v. Corriveau, 126 Conn. App. 231 (2011):
(Sullivan, J.) The defendant-wife appealed the judgment dissolving her marriage on the grounds that the trial court failed to sua sponte canvass her regarding her competency to represent herself; improperly terminated her right to cross examination and to present evidence; and failed to give her guidance on the presentation of evidence at trial.  The Appellate Court held that her claim regarding the court’s failure to canvass her was not reviewable under Golding, as it did not amount to a violation of her constitutional rights.  The court further held that she did not present evidence that would trigger a court’s duty to inquire into her competence otherwise.  The defendant’s second claim as to her right to cross examination also did not violate her constitutional rights, and was not properly reviewed under Golding.  The court gave her great latitude in conducting cross examination and had ample opportunity to present any evidence.  Third, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to provide the defendant with assistance, beyond giving her great leeway, in her presentation of evidence.

Griswold v. Stern, 126 Conn. App. 265 (2011):
(Mihalakos, J.) The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant due to the plaintiff’s withdrawal of her expert witness disclosure.  The Appellate Court held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment, finding that expert testimony was necessary for the plaintiff’s claim of medical malpractice to be successful.  The plaintiff withdrew the disclosure after failing to comply with the trial court’s scheduling order regarding her expert’s deposition.  She did not indicate that she would disclose any other experts after the withdrawal, despite having an abundance of time to do so.  Summary judgment for the defendant was properly granted.

McCarthy v. Custom Design Services, Inc., 126 Conn. App. 274 (2011):
(Alvord, J.) The plaintiff, Commissioner of Environmental Protection, appealed the trial court’s order denying her motion for contempt.  The Appellate Court held that the motion was properly denied.  The parties had entered a stipulated judgment in regard to the defendant’s contamination of soil or groundwater.  The stipulated judgment had two provisions, one that the defendants would remediate and the other that if they failed to remediate, they would pay a civil fine.  The Appellate Court held that the stipulated judgment was not reasonably clear and unambiguous in that it could not be ascertained whether the two provisions were alternatives to each other.  The stipulated judgment was not clear as to whether the defendants would have to remediate even after they became liable for the civil fine, and as such, they could not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the stipulated judgment.

In re Emile L., 126 Conn. App. 283 (2011):
(Per Curiam) The parents of the minor child appealed the trial court’s termination of their parental rights.  The Appellate Court affirmed the termination.  The trial court properly found that both the father and the mother failed to rehabilitate to the point where they proved they could assume a responsible position on their child’s life.  The father failed to participate seriously in the court-ordered programs that would lead to his rehabilitation.  His failure to rehabilitate was also proven by his problems with drugs, alcohol, and domestic violence, and his failure to submit to hair and urine screenings.  As to the mother, the court properly found that despite her participation in scheduled visits with the child, her problems with substance abuse and domestic violence kept her from properly rehabilitating.  The mother continually dodged drug tests, and when she did submit, she tested positive for cocaine.