Connecticut Supreme Court

Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681 (2011):
(McLachlan, J.)  The intended parent plaintiffs, Anthony Raftopol (the biological father) and his same-sex domestic partner Shawn Hargon, brought suit against the defendant surrogate mother, Karma A. Ramey, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of a gestational agreement under which Ramey had agreed to terminate her putative parental rights and to consent to the adoption of any resulting children by Hargon.  Ramey was carrying embryos created using eggs recovered from a third-party egg donor and fertilized with sperm contributed by Raftopol.  Ramey gave birth to twins three months early, and the plaintiffs brought this suit prior to the expected delivery date.  The defendant Department of Public Health (DPH) objected, contending that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Hargon did not allege that he had conceived the children and because the court lacked jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of the gestational carrier, the egg donor, and any husband either may have, which DPH argued was a prerequisite to a declaration that Hargon is a parent of the children.  After a hearing, the trial court issued a ruling declaring that (1) the gestational agreement is valid; (2) Raftopol is the genetic and legal father of the children; (3) Hargon is the legal father of the children; and (4) Ramey is not the genetic or legal mother of the children.  The court then ordered DPH to issue a replacement birth certificate.  This appeal followed.  Attorneys Kenneth J. Bartschi and Karen L. Dowd, both of Horton, Shields & Knox, P.C., filed a brief, with others, for the American Society of Reproductive Medicine et al. as amici curiae.

After transferring the appeal to itself, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that (1) the surrogate mother – a gestational carrier – had no parental rights with respect to the children, to whom she bore no biological relationship, and so there were no rights requiring termination before Hargon could acquire parental status; (2) the trial court had jurisdiction under General Statutes § 7-48a – because this was not an adoption proceeding but instead a proceeding regarding a request for a declaratory judgment under § 7-48a – to declare a domestic partner a legal parent; and (3) as a matter of first impression, an intended parent who is a party to a valid gestational agreement may become a parent pursuant to § 7-48a without first adopting the children.

St. Paul Travelers Cos. v. Kuehl, 299 Conn. 800 (2011):
(McLachlan, J.)  The plaintiff insurance company filed a declaratory judgment action seeking that General Statutes § 31-294c (d), which created an exception to the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 31-294c (a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act for bringing claims for compensation, be declared unconstitutional.  The named defendant, Sylvia N. Kuehl, had initially filed a claim for survivor’s benefits, which claim had been dismissed by the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner as untimely and which dismissal was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court on the basis that Kuehl had improperly failed to file a formal notice of claim within the statute of limitations period.  After that dismissal, Kuehl sued the intervening defendants, who had represented her in that action.  They reached a settlement agreement under which the intervening defendants would seek to have § 31-294c (a) amended by the legislature in order to allow Kuehl to refile her claim for survivor’s benefits.  After the legislature made such an amendment by adopting the exception now codified at § 31-294c (d), Kuehl filed a notice of claim with the Commissioner, seeking survivor’s benefits for the second time.  The Commissioner concluded that Kuehl’s second claim was barred by the Supreme Court’s earlier decision and advised the plaintiff insurance company to bring the present action challenging the constitutionality of the exception in § 31-294c (d).  The trial court thereafter concluded that that statutory exception constituted a public emolument designed to benefit Kuehl individually, in violation of the state constitution, and rendered summary judgment for the plaintiff.  The intervening defendants appealed, claiming that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to declare § 31-294c (d) unconstitutional because the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action and had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court had properly determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction.  The Court concluded that the plaintiff demonstrated that it had standing to bring the declaratory action because its legal interest in being protected from defending against a stale claim was “specially and injuriously affected” by the exception in § 31-294c (d) and because the case fell within the futility exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine.  The Court recognized that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies because the Commissioner previously had been expressly barred from addressing the constitutionality of § 31-204c (d) but could not issue appropriate relief to the plaintiff until the constitutionality of that section was determined.

Wilton Meadows Ltd. Partnership v. Coratolo, 299 Conn. 819 (2011):
(Norcott, J.)  The plaintiff, a licensed chronic care and convalescent facility, filed suit against the defendant, the decedent’s widow, claiming that she was responsible for a disputed balance of money due the plaintiff for services rendered for her deceased husband’s care including, inter alia, general nursing care, room and board.  The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was responsible pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-37 (b), which, as the spousal liability statute, provides, inter alia, that each spouse shall be liable for any article purchased by either that has gone to the support of the family or the joint benefit of both.  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that § 46b-37 was unambiguous, that the term “article” did not apply to the services rendered by the plaintiff, that the decedent’s consumption of food and medicine did not constitute items in “support of the family,” and that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was the proper vehicle for challenging the legal sufficiency of the complaint.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that (1) although the term “article” was ambiguous, § 46b-37 (b) does not include within its scope services or general expenses associated with nursing home care; (2) the plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured by repleading by virtue of the Court’s conclusion that nursing home expenses are excluded from § 46b-37 (b) as a matter of law; and (3) the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was improper could not succeed because there were no disputed material facts and the sole material issue before the court was a legal one, which was decided in favor of the defendant and which controlled the disposition of the case.

Burbank v. Bd. of Educ., 299 Conn. 833 (2011):
(Palmer, J.)  The plaintiffs, a student at Canton High School and the student’s parents, filed suit to enjoin the defendant Board of Education of Canton from conducting, in accordance with the Board’s policies, warrantless, suspicionless sweeps of unattended student lockers and motor vehicles on public school property with dogs specially trained to detect illegal substances.  Alternatively, the plaintiffs sought to require the defendant to give parents notice of any sweep at least 48 hours in advance.  The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ application for injunctive relief, finding that the defendant’s policies and the sweeps themselves did not violate either the parents’ or the students’ constitutional rights.  The plaintiffs appealed and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Court held that the plaintiffs’ claims were moot because, at the time the appeal was heard, the plaintiff student had graduated from high school and no longer attended a Canton public high school.  The student therefore was not subject to the defendant’s policies and/or sweeps.  The Court also recognized that there were many parents of other students at either the high or middle schools in Canton with standing to bring an action for injunctive relief against the Board who would be able to obtain a final resolution prior to their student’s graduation.  The plaintiffs’ claims therefore did not fall under the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Merrill v. NRT New England, Inc., 126 Conn. App. 314 (2011):
(Bishop, J.)  The plaintiff, Rebecca Merrill, brought suit against the defendants for breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence and intentional misrepresentation and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).  The plaintiff had purchased a house that she claimed was misrepresented as a “corner lot.”  When the defendants were served with a summons and complaint, those documents bore a return date of July 22, 2008.  Because the marshal did not return process to plaintiff’s counsel until after the sixth day preceding July 22nd, however, plaintiff’s counsel changed the return date to August 26, 2008 on revised copies of the summons and complaint filed with the court.  The defendants thereafter, on September 8, 2008, filed with the court an appearance and a request to revise.  On October 24, 2008, they filed a motion to dismiss, alleging insufficient service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motion on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction because it determined that there was never a return made for the June 29, 2008 summons and complaint.  After unsuccessfully moving for reargument, the plaintiff appealed, claiming (1) that the trial court improperly found that she never returned to the court the summons and complaint that had been served on the defendant; and (2) that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was untimely.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) that the procedural facts in the record did not present a failure of service but instead defective process, so the court’s subject matter jurisdiction was not implicated and (2) that because the defendants did not file their motion to dismiss challenging the court’s personal jurisdiction within thirty days after their counsel filed an appearance, they waived their opportunity to challenge personal jurisdiction on the basis of defective service.

Pack 2000, Inc. v. Cushman, 126 Conn. App. 339 (2011):
(Lavery, J.)  The plaintiff, Pack 2000, Inc., a prospective buyer, brought suit against the defendant seller seeking specific performance of two options to purchase property that the plaintiff had leased from the defendant.  After a trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court (1) was required to apply a strict compliance standard in determining whether the plaintiff had fulfilled conditions precedent to its exercise of the options to purchase; and (2) improperly found that the plaintiff had retained its right to exercise the options.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case with direction to enter judgment for the defendant.  The Court held that (1) the trial court was required to apply a strict rather than substantial compliance standard to determine the satisfaction of conditions precedent in order for the buyer to exercise its options to purchase the leased property; and (2) the buyer did not demonstrate strict compliance with conditions precedent and therefore had not retained its right to exercise its options to purchase the leased property.

Kenny v. Orange, 126 Conn. App. 351 (2011):
(Per Curiam.)  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, adopting the decision of the trial court.

Unifund CCR Partners v. Schaeppi, 126 Conn. App. 370 (2011):
(West, J.)  The plaintiff creditor filed a complaint seeking to collect credit card debt allegedly owed by the defendants.  After a hearing and rehearing, the attorney fact finder entered a report recommending judgment for the plaintiff.  The plaintiff then successfully filed with the court a motion for weekly payments.  A couple of months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint seeking foreclosure on the judgment lien.  The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to liability, which the trial court denied.  The court also found that no money judgment had entered in the prior proceedings because the attorney fact finder had made no finding as to the amount of debt.  The plaintiff therefore filed a motion with the trial court seeking clarification of its earlier judgment.  The court concluded that there was no money judgment entered in that action and, as such, there was no basis for the court to clarify the judgment.  The defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment addressing the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment.  After a hearing, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion and the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that (1) the trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment even though it lacked the requisite accompanying memorandum of law; and (2) the trial court properly determined that no money judgment had entered in the prior proceedings.

Connecticut Supreme Court

Bennett v. New Milford Hospital, Inc., 300 Conn. 1 (2011):
(Norcott, J.) The plaintiff sued an emergency room doctor who had treated him, but his medical malpractice suit was dismissed, as the written opinion he had attached to his complaint was not authored by a “similar health care provider,” as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-190a.  The defendant doctor was a specialist in emergency medicine, whereas the doctor who authored the opinion attached to the complaint was a general surgeon who had qualifications in surgical critical care and who was engaged in the practice of trauma surgery.  The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit, holding that the two doctors were not similar health care providers.  The plaintiff should have attached an opinion from a doctor trained and certified in emergency medicine.  Further, the statute requires that the doctor be a “similar health care provider,” not merely just an otherwise qualified expert.  The Court also held that dismissal of the action is the proper remedy for noncompliance with § 52-190a.

Plante v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 300 Conn. 33 (2011):
(Norcott, J.)  The plaintiff’s initial action was dismissed as she failed to comply with the statutory requirement that a written opinion of a similar health care provider that there was evidence of medical negligence be included with her medical malpractice complaint.  The plaintiff re-filed the suit after the statute of limitations had run, and alleged that the accidental failure of suit statute saved her untimely claim.  The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, holding that the failure to attach the medical opinion is so egregious that the mistake is not within the meaning of the accidental failure of suit statute.  The court held that accidental failure of suit only saves medical malpractice actions filed without the written opinion when the failure to attach it is out of “mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” 

DiGiovanna v. St. George, 300 Conn. 59 (2011):
(Katz, J.) The trial court denied the application of a child’s mother’s ex-boyfriend (the plaintiff) for visitation rights because it was found to not be in the best interest of the child, even though the plaintiff proved that he had a parental-like relationship with the child and that disallowing visitation would result in “harm akin to abuse and neglect,” which is the standard for non-parental visitation rights set forth in Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202 (2002).  The Supreme Court reversed the denial, holding that the best interest of the child standard does not overcome the strict Roth burden of proof. 

Palmer, J., dissenting.  The best interest of the child standard and the Roth standard are not conflicting, but are appropriately considered together.  If the child is less harmed by denying visitation than by granting it, visitation is properly denied. 

Eveleigh, J., dissenting.  The Roth standard does not replace the best interest of the child standard.  Rather, the court should consider the best interest standard after it finds that the applicant has met his burden under Roth, and should deny visitation if it is not in the best interest of the child.

Connecticut Appellate Court

DePietro v. Dept. of Public Safety, 126 Conn. App. 414 (2011):
(Gruendel, J.) The plaintiff was injured in a car accident while acting in the course of his employment with the state.  He sued the state for uninsured motorist benefits under the state’s self-insurance policy.  The trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that sovereign immunity barred the plaintiff’s claim, and that because he did not have approval of the claims commissioner prior to filing his action, it was properly dismissed.  Further, the plaintiff’s grievance filed under the collective bargaining agreement between the state and the state police union did not give the superior court jurisdiction over his claim.

Dupont, J., dissenting.  The plaintiff’s claim was not barred by sovereign immunity, in light of Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 29-177 and 29-178, in which the state waived its sovereign immunity against claims like this.  Those two statutes provide uninsured motorist benefits to a Connecticut State Trooper injured in the course of his employment, and should also extend to a special police officer, such as the plaintiff.

Kravetz v. Kravetz, 126 Conn. App. 459 (2011):
(Beach, J.) Post-dissolution, the husband filed a motion to modify child support based on the fact that one of his children had turned 18 and was no longer eligible for child support.  The Appellate Court affirmed the reduction of child support and the trial court’s method for reducing the support by one child.  (The court had initially doubled the presumptive amount of child support for four children, which was $600, to award the mother $1200 per week.  The court reduced the amount by the presumptive reduction for one child, or $59.  It then reduced the extra $600 per week in the initial award by 25% for one child, or $150, for a total reduction of $209.)  The Appellate Court also affirmed the denial of the mother’s contempt motion for the father’s alleged failure to pay his share of extraordinary expenses, as the expenses claimed by the mother were contemplated for in the award of double child support, and were not extraordinary expenses.  The mother was also required to pay the father’s attorney’s fees, as her motion for contempt was not successful.  The mother’s argument that the father could afford his own attorney’s fees was unavailing.

Riley v. Pierson, 126 Conn. App. 486 (2011):
(Per Curiam) The plaintiff elected to prepay the balance of his mortgage, despite the penalty associated with prepayment.  The plaintiff sued the mortgagee for breach of contract, and argued that the mortgagee had agreed to an accord and satisfaction of the original agreement, specifically that the plaintiff pay the balance of the mortgage and a portion of the prepayment penalty.  The trial court granted summary judgment for the mortgagee, holding that the evidence established that there was a good faith dispute over the prepayment penalty, and that the plaintiff failed to prove that he entered the accord and satisfaction under duress.  The Appellate Court affirmed.

In re Chronesca D., 126 Conn. App. 493 (2011):
(Gruendel, J.) The child’s father appealed the trial court’s decision to temporarily grant custody to his cousin.  The Appellate Court reversed, finding that the child was not in immediate danger of physical harm.  The Appellate Court held that a finding of immediate physical danger is required before the court can enter an order giving temporary custody to anyone but a parent.  Because there was no substantial showing of immediate danger in this case, the trial court improperly granted temporary custody to the father’s cousin.

Supreme Court

McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 300 Conn. 144 (2011):

(Eveleigh, J.)  General Statutes § 14-227a (g) (2) provides that a person who is convicted twice within a ten-year period of the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drug, or both, shall, inter alia, be imprisoned not more than two years.  The plaintiff, Ricky A. McCoy, was convicted under § 14-277a for driving while intoxicated for the second time in a ten-year period and he requested that the defendant provide him with a copy of his criminal history record.  When he received it, it included the designation “convicted felon.”  He thereafter challenged the defendant’s designation of the plaintiff as a convicted felon and when the defendant refused to remove the designation, the plaintiff filed suit requesting a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from classifying any person as a convicted felon on the basis of a second conviction in ten years under § 14-227a.  The trial court issued a declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding that a second conviction within ten years under § 14-227a could not be classified as a felony because it falls under the motor vehicle violation exception to the statutory definition of a criminal offense.  The defendant appealed and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that a second conviction in ten years under § 14-227a does not fall within the motor vehicle violation exception to the classification statute’s definition of a criminal offense because it carries a possible term of imprisonment in excess of one year and thus constitutes a felony.

(Katz, J., dissenting)  Justice Katz dissented from the opinion of the Majority of the Court and would hold that the only interpretation of the motor vehicle violation exception in the Penal Code that does not essentially render the exception meaningless is one under which § 14-227a falls under that exception.  The statutory text, the legislative history, and related statutes require that the motor vehicle violation exception refers to any breach of a motor vehicle law, including a breach of § 14-227a.  This requires that a second qualifying violation of § 14-227a does not constitute a felony.

Appellate Court:

Lombardi v. East Haven, 126 Conn. App. 563 (2011).

(Schaller, J.)  The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant city under the municipal highway defect statute after suffering injuries she allegedly sustained when she tripped and fell over a three-inch raised sidewalk on a street in East Haven.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and the trial court denied the defendant’s motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict and rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.  The defendant appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain evidence, including the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert, an engineer, and a log of calls to the town regarding conditions that needed attention on the street where the defective sidewalk was located.  The Court also held that the defendant had constructive notice of the defect in the sidewalk and that the plaintiff’s testimony was sufficient to support a finding that she was not contributorily negligent.

Gateway, Kelso & Co. v. West Hartford No. 1, LLC, 126 Conn. App. 578 (2011).

(Robinson, J.)  The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, West Hartford No. 1, LLC, seeking to recover damages for, inter alia, fraud with regard to the defendant’s failure to pay the plaintiff a $500,000 fee in a real estate transaction.  The plaintiff filed an application for a prejudgment remedy (PJR) seeking an order authorizing an attachment of the defendant’s property in the amount of $500,000.  The defendant opposed the application, claiming that the plaintiff was seeking to enforce a brokerage agreement and that because the defendant did not have a broker’s license, the plaintiff was barred from bringing an action to enforce the agreement.  The trial court denied the plaintiff’s application and the defendant thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s application collaterally estopped the plaintiff from further litigating that issue.  The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the defendant appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the factual finding made in the PJR proceeding could not be accorded collateral estoppel effect because, inter alia, the PJR hearing did not provide a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

Warner v. Bicknell, 126 Conn. 588 (2011).

(DiPentima, C.J.)  The plaintiff, the paternal grandmother, filed an application for visitation rights with the defendant’s minor child that the trial court granted.  The defendant appealed and the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the two-part test for standing established by our Supreme Court for a third party seeking visitation against the wishes of a fit parent.  Specifically, the plaintiff did not show in good faith that she had a relationship with the child that is similar in nature to a parent-child relationship and that a denial of visitation would cause real and significant harm to the child.

Supreme Court

Tzovolos v. Wiseman, 300 Conn. 247 (2011):
(Per Curiam) In a dispute over security interests in restaurant equipment, the court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff’s, holding that the trial court resolved all issues properly in a thoughtful and thorough memorandum.  The Court adopted the trial court’s statements of fact and law as to all the defendant’s claims on appeal, namely claims of improper denial of a request for a jury trial; trying the case before the pleadings were closed; refusal to allow amendment of pleadings; finding of the plaintiffs’ security interest; finding that the plaintiffs proved their claim of conversion; finding of the defendants’ fraudulent conveyance; finding that the defendants had violated CUTPA; finding of defendants’ personal liability for the debts of the LLC whose equipment was in dispute; finding of defendants’ tortuous interference with contractual relations and a finding of bad faith pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-226a.

Harbour Pointe, LLC v. Harbour Landing Condominium Assn., Inc., 300 Conn. 254 (2011):
(McLachlan, J.) The Court affirmed a decision of the trial court holding that a condominium declaration clearly and unambiguously provided that easements running across the land were terminable only if the condominium complex expanded to add certain other properties.  The Court found that the original declaration contemplated expansion from 1 plot to 5 plots, and allowed any of the 5 plots that were not within the complex to have utility easements over the plots in the complex.  The easements were continued “until and unless” the remaining plots were joined into the complex.  When the period for expansion expired, only 2 plots were within the complex.  The Court found that the easements continued as to the remaining 3 plots, since “until and unless” and other contractual language clearly and unambiguously indicated that the original intent of the parties was to allow the easements to continue and that the complex had expanded to the extent possible until the declaration. 
Vertefeuille, J., Dissenting.  The easements were meant to terminate with the expiration of the right to expand the complex.  The condominium declaration should not have been interpreted in the same way as a normal contract, namely by looking at the intent of the drafters.  The Condominium Act of 1976 and the legislative history of that Act should also be considered.  Further, the burden of ambiguity in the drafting of the contract should be construed against the drafter.  In all, the declaration here should be viewed as protecting the condominium owners, and the easements should have terminated with the right to expand.

Sosin v. Sosin, 300 Conn. 205 (2011):
(Palmer, J.) The parties both appealed financial orders incident to the dissolution of their marriage.  The trial court initially ordered the ex-husband to pay the ex-wife a lump sum out of his bank and brokerage accounts, and later reduced that sum after the husband filed a Motion to Reargue.  When the ex-husband only paid a portion of the reduced sum, the ex-wife filed a motion for contempt.  The trial court ordered the ex-husband to pay the remaining balance plus interest.  The Appellate Court affirmed, but remanded the case so that the parties could have a hearing on the amount of interest to be awarded.  The Supreme Court affirmed the order requiring the ex-husband to pay the full amount of the sum and the order for interest.  The Court found that the trial court did not err in reducing the original sum, as it was not an improper modification of an original judgment.  Further, the trial court could have properly found that the ex-husband wrongfully withheld the full payment, justifying interest under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a.  The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s decision to remand for the interest hearing, holding that the trial court’s record was sufficiently clear to support the amount of interest awarded.

Appellate Court

Kores v. Calo, 126 Conn. App. 609 (2011):
(Bear, J.) The plaintiff landowner sued his neighbor for interfering with an easement over the defendant’s driveway and for private nuisance for the defendant’s parking a camper in front of the plaintiff’s home, blocking the view from the plaintiff’s front windows.  The trial court found that the defendant had interfered with the plaintiff’s easement rights and that the camper created a temporary nuisance, and awarded the plaintiff $27,000 in damages for the interference with the easement rights.  The defendant later filed a motion for articulation and to set aside the verdict.  The court, in its opinion, treated the motion as a motion to set aside the verdict, and reduced the verdict to $100 in nominal damages.  The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the trial court had authority to set aside its judgment.  The plaintiff had notice that the defendant was attempting to reduce the damages award, and the trial court can set aside its judgment within four months of its rendition, which timeframe was met here.  Also, the Appellate Court held that the defendant’s failure to pay the filing fee with its motion for articulation was not a jurisdictional defect.  The Appellate Court did not consider the plaintiff’s two remaining claims, as the same were not properly preserved for review.

Marchand v. Smith, 126 Conn. App. 626 (2011):
(Per Curiam) The plaintiff sued a hospital and doctors who had treated him for unlawful restraint, assault and battery, negeligent and reckless false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, all of which are tort claims.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis that none of the claims were filed within the applicable three year statute of limitations.  Further, the claims were not saved by the accidental failure of suit statute because both § 52-291 and § 52-292 were wholly inapplicable to the plaintiff’s case.

Brewster Park, LLC v. Berger, 126 Conn. App. 630 (2011):
(Stoughton, J.) The trial court awarded the plaintiff damages and attorneys’ fees for the defendant’s nonpayment of rent from the date the defendant became aware of the default for nonpayment to the date the defendant vacated the premises.  The Appellate Court upheld the damages award, holding that the plaintiff was not barred from recovering merely because he did not include the statutory provision for damages stemming from use and occupancy in his complaint.  Because the complaint clearly identified his claim, it was allowed.  Further, because the lease agreement was not signed by the defendant, but by a third party, there was no agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant.  This did not relieve the defendant of any obligation to the plaintiff, however, because he did occupy the unit at issue.  The defendant was liable for the damages for use and occupancy after the notice to quit was filed.  The Court reversed the award of attorneys’ fees, however, because there was no agreement between the parties here.  The only agreement for attorneys’ fees was between the plaintiff and a third person who signed the lease for the defendant’s unit.
Bear, J., Dissenting and Concurring.  The majority is correct as to the damages award, but should have also affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff.  The language used in the portion of the lease that the defendant personally signed extended his liability to attorneys fees, as well.

Aaron Manor, Inc. v. Irving, 126 Conn. App. 646 (2011):
(Alvord, J.) The plaintiff is a skilled nursing care facility at which the defendant’s father resided.  The defendant signed her father’s admission paperwork as the contact point for her father and an agreement that if she had control or access to her father’s income or assets, she would agree that those funds would be used for her father’s stay at the plaintiff’s facility.  When an invoice for the father’s treatment went unpaid, the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract, alleging that she had received gifts from her father’s accounts that she should have used to pay his bill.  The plaintiff argued that these gifts showed that the defendant had access to her father’s assets, despite the fact that the defendant’s bother had sole control over her father’s accounts.  The trial court held that the defendant did not breach the contract because she the monetary gifts did not give her control or access to her father’s assets and she was not required to turn the gifts over to the plaintiff.  The Appellate Court affirmed.  However, the Court reversed the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to the defendant pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-150bb, which provides that a consumer pay recover attorneys’ fees against a commercial party when the consumer successfully defends a contract action.  The Court held that the defendant was not a consumer as intended under the statute because she was not a buyer, debtor, lessee, or personal representative thereof. 
Schaller, J., Dissenting and Concurring.  The defendant did not breach the contract.  However, the defendant should have been awarded attorneys fees because a consumer includes a personal representative, and the defendant was a personal representative of her father, the buyer of services.  A personal representative includes those people who act “as a custodian or guardian of a person who lacks capacity.”  The defendant fit this relationship with her father with regard to the home he lived in.  In further proof, the plaintiff filed this action against the defendant specifically because she was the personal representative of her father. 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Villeneuve, 126 Conn. App. 692 (2011):
(Alvord, J.) The respondent appealed the suspension of his license to practice law.  He was grieved after making misrepresentations on his resume in applying for a position with the workers compensation commission.  The complaint listed Rules 8.1(1), 8.2(a) and 8.4(4) as possible violations.  The respondent was eventually found in violation of Rules 8.4(3) and (4), and his license was suspended.  The respondent appealed on the grounds that Rule 8.4(3) was not initially listed in the complaint.  He further argued that because he had two motions to dismiss pending at the time of his presentment hearing (one of which was denied at the hearing), the court lacked jurisdiction to enter a presentment.  The Appellate Court held that the presentment court did have jurisdiction, as the superior court has “inherent authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline the members of the bar.”  Further, the respondent’s due process rights were not implicated by a finding of a violation of Rule 8.4(3) even though the same was not listed in the complaint.  The respondent had an opportunity to be heard on Rule 8.4(3), and was, in fact, heard on that Rule, as he addressed it in his written statement that was accepted into evidence by the reviewing committee during its initial hearing.

Rodriguez v. E.D. Construction, Inc., 126 Conn. App. 717 (2011):
(Foti, J.) The claimant appealed a decision from the workers compensation review board affirming a denial of benefits by the trial commissioner because the claimant was an independent contractor.  The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the claimant was an independent contractor.  The claimant did not meet his burden of proof that he was an employee and therefore covered by the workers compensation act.  The claimant used his own tools, was paid an hourly rate, owned his own roofing business, hired his own workers to complete roofing jobs for the defendant, contracted for and completed roofing jobs independent of the defendant, independently executed a general liability insurance policy, received annual 1099 tax forms from the defendant, and knowingly signed exclusionary forms stating that he was an independent contractor and not covered by the workers compensation act.

Shenkman-Tyler v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 126 Conn. App. 733 (2011):
(Harper, J.) The plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action against the insurer for proceeds of the insurance policy on his ex-wife’s beach house property that was destroyed by fire during the pendency of their dissolution action.  The trial court awarded all proceeds to the wife as part of the financial orders incident to dissolution.  Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the insurer for breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, a violation of CUTPA, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.  The trial court dismissed both actions on the basis that the plaintiff had no standing to assert the claims, as the wife was awarded a sole interest in the insurance proceeds.  The Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action as nonjusticiable because no practical relief could be afforded to the plaintiff, since the financial orders incident to the dissolution action awarded any interest in the insurance proceeds to the ex-wife.  The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the breach of contract, good faith and fair dealing, and CUTPA claims because the plaintiff had no interest under the insurance policy, and therefore, lacked the “specific, personal and legal interest” necessary for standing to bring such a claim.  The Court reversed dismissal as to the emotional distress claim, however, because the claim was based on the insurer’s treatment of the plaintiff during its investigation of the underlying insurance claim. 

Greene v. Waterbury, 126 Conn. App. 746 (2011):
(Robinson, J.) The plaintiff was a firefighter in the City of Waterbury and voluntarily resigned and withdrew his application for a disability pension after he suffered a work-related injury.  His attorney subsequently sought to reinstate his application for a disability pension, but the pension board denied the request.  The plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the board acted illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion in denying the request because he had fulfilled all requirements to obtain a disability pension.  The Court upheld the denial, finding that the collective bargaining agreement that controlled the pension board required that the applicant be “actually participating” in the retirement system to be eligible for a disability pension.  Because the plaintiff here voluntarily resigned, he was no longer eligible.  The Court also found that the plaintiff’s situation was different from a firefighter who retired from service or who the City retired from service and was then given a disability pension because those who were retired were still actually participating in the retirement system.  The plaintiff, who had resigned, was not actually participating. 

Schirmer v. Souza, 126 Conn. App. 759 (2011):
(Bishop, J.) The plaintiffs’ daughter and her husband purchased a home, and later transferred title in the property to the defendants, the husband’s parents.  The defendants agreed to let the daughter and son live in the house and make periodic payments to them.  When the daughter and son decided to renovate the house, they obtained a loan from the plaintiffs without informing the plaintiffs that title to the house was in the defendants’ names.  After the renovations were complete, the house was sold for $114,000 more than the initial purchase price plus the plaintiffs’ loan for the renovations.  The plaintiffs sued the defendants for unjust enrichment, as the defendants did not pay the plaintiffs any portion of the sale price or repay the money loaned for renovations.  The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s award for unjust enrichment, holding that a contractual relationship is not a prerequisite to recovery on such a claim.  The trial court properly found that the defendants realized the benefits of the renovations, despite the fact that they did not chose to renovate the property themselves.  The defendants received a profit on the sale of the property, which unjustly enriched them.   The Appellate Court also affirmed the trial court’s calculation of the amount of damages.  Ordinarily, damages should equal the amount the defendant was enriched by.  Here, however, because the amount of enrichment was “demonstrable but inexact,” it was not clearly erroneous for the court to instead award the plaintiffs the amount they loaned for renovations.