Connecticut Supreme Court

Mayfield v. Goshen Volunteer Fire Co., 301 Conn. 739 (2011):
(Harper, J.)  The plaintiff, the State Commissioner of Labor, applied to the trial court for a warrant to inspect the defendant volunteer fire company’s firehouse in order to determine whether it was in compliance with the Connecticut Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).  The plaintiff previously had been denied access to the firehouse.  The warrant application alleged that probable cause existed that some conditions at the firehouse posed a threat to the members of the fire company.  The defendant is a nonprofit, nonstick membership corporation whose volunteer members received no salary or pension but were eligible to receive workers’ compensation benefits.  The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the defendant did not qualify as an “employer” under OSHA and therefore was beyond the purview of OSHA.  The plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly limited its analysis to the question of whether the defendant was a political subdivision of the state for the purposes of OSHA.  The Supreme Court transferred the case to itself and thereafter affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the defendant was not a political subdivision of the state subject to OSHA.  Specifically, the Court held that the plain and unambiguous meaning of “political subdivision” in OSHA excluded the defendant from coverage under the act.  In addition, the Court declined to deem the defendant a public agency of the town and thus an employer subject to the act.

Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759 (2011):
(Norcott, J.)  The plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant, sued for damages for wrongful termination of employment as principal of a parish school operated by the defendant.  The plaintiff claimed that, by not renewing her employment contract, the defendant, inter alia, breached an implied contract, breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breached the doctrine of promissory estoppel.  The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, which was based on the ground that the action was barred under the First Amendment of the federal constitution under the ministerial exception to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over employment conflicts between religious institutions and their leaders.  The defendant appealed and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that (1) the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss was an appealable final judgment; and (2) that the ministerial exception of the First Amendment barred all of the plaintiff’s claims.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Walgreen Eastern Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 130 Conn. App. 422 (2011):
(Peters, J.)  This is a pair of consolidated appeals involving the same parties.  The plaintiff, a pharmacy, sought to open a pharmacy on property formerly used as a supermarket.  The plaintiff sought only to make interior changes to the building on the property, but town zoning authorities refused to authorize the plaintiff’s proposed change of use.  In the first appeal, the plaintiff appealed from the defendant Zoning Board of Appeals decision requiring the plaintiff to apply for a certificate of zoning compliance.  In the second appeal, the plaintiff appealed from the defendant town Planning and Zoning Commission’s denial of the plaintiff’s application for a certificate of compliance.  The trial court in both appeals rendered judgments dismissing the appeals, and the plaintiff, upon the granting of certification, appealed to the Appellate Court.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court, holding that (1) the plaintiff was not entitled to review of the decision of the defendant Zoning Board of Appeals because it had failed to establish the requisite statutory factual predicate for its appeal; (2) the plaintiff was not entitled to a certificate of zoning compliance, as it could not revisit that issue in this appeal and had nevertheless failed to show that the denial of the certificate was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal; and (3) the trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion to reargue.

Planning & Zoning Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission, 130 Conn. App. 448 (2011):
(Beach, J.)  The plaintiff, the Planning and Zoning Commission of Pomfret, appealed the decision of the defendant FOIC determining that the plaintiff had violated the Freedom of Information Act by refusing oral requests for documents made by attendees of a public planning meeting.  The documents concerned proposed amendments to the town zoning regulations.  The trial court sustained the plaintiff’s appeals and the defendant appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court on an alternate basis raised by the plaintiff, holding that the public attendees were statutorily required to request the documents in writing and, because they did not do so, the plaintiff did not violate FOIA by failing to provide them with a copy of the documents at the time of the requests.

Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., 130 Conn. App. 502 (2011):
(Alvord, J.)  The plaintiff, who was injured in a rear-end collision car accident at a traffic light, sought to receive underinsured motorist benefits due under a car insurance policy issued to the plaintiff by the defendant insurance company.  After a jury trial, a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.  The trial court denied the defendant’s pre-verdict motion for a directed verdict and post-verdict motion to set aside the verdict and rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict; the defendant appealed.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence sufficient for the jury to infer negligence by the other driver in the car accident.  The plaintiff did not see the other driver’s car before the accident, and did not know where the other driver was looking, what the other driver’s speed was, or whether the other driver attempted to apply his breaks and swerve at the time of impact.  The Court held that the trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to set aside the jury’s verdict, as the fact that there was a collision by itself was not sufficient to establish legal cause.

Balaska v. Balaska, 130 Conn. App. 510 (2011):
(Borden, J.)  The plaintiff ex-wife filed a post-dissolution motion to modify custody and visitation with respect to two children born of her marriage to the defendant ex-husband.  The defendant had filed a motion to modify custody and increased visitation.  The trial court suspended the defendant’s visitation with regard to one child and increased his visitation with the other child; the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly increased the defendant’s visitation without finding a substantial change in circumstances, as such a finding is not a prerequisite to modification of visitation.  In addition, the Court declined to hear the plaintiff’s unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly ordered both parties to attend parental counseling but did not afford the plaintiff an evidentiary hearing first.  Finally, the Court held that the trial court’s finding of the plaintiff’s alienation of one child from the defendant was not grounds for reversing the order increasing the defendant’s visitation with the other child.

Brown v. Brown, 130 Conn. App. 522 (2011):
(Gruendel, J.)  Attorneys Michael S. Taylor and Kennedy J. Bartschi of Horton, Shields and Knox, P.C. represented the plaintiff-appellant in this matter.  The plaintiff ex-husband appealed from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the defendant ex-wife and making certain financial orders.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that (1) the record adequately supported the trial court’s award to the defendant of $20,000 in monthly alimony payments; (2) any error in the trial court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s testimony regarding the deterioration of the value of the plaintiff’s real estate properties after January 23, 2009 was harmless.

Connecticut Supreme Court

Ethics Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission, 302 Conn. 1 (2011):
(McLachlan, J.) The plaintiff ethics commission appealed four decisions by the defendant FOIC requiring the plaintiff to record its executive, non-public sessions.  The Supreme Court reversed the FOIC and lower court’s decisions, holding that the FOIC did not have the power under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-206(b)(2) to order the plaintiff to make audio recordings its executive or closed sessions.  The Court noted that its ruling in this situation was a narrow one.

Palmer, J., Concurring.  While the FOIC does have the power to issue these types of orders under § 1-206(b)(2), the majority’s conclusion that an order for audio records was improper here is correct.  To issue such an order under these factual circumstances would have been an abuse of the FOIC’s power.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Marlborough v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 818-052, 130 Conn. App. 556 (2011):
(Robinson, J.) The plaintiff town sought to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrators ignored a clearly existing legal principle.  Specifically, the town claimed that the panel disregarded Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-187(a) in discharging the town assessor from her position.  The Appellate Court held that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proving a manifest disregard for the law, because even if the statute did apply, it was not well-defined or explicit.  The statute only specifically applied to “town officers” and did not reference assessors or define “town officers” to include assessors.  The Court declined to vacate the arbitration award.

Beach, J., Dissenting.  The panel did act with manifest disregard of the law, because § 9-187(a), in referring to “town officers” clearly includes assessors, as assessors are referred to as “town officers” in § 9-185.  The case should have been remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the arbitration award.

Lucas v. Zoning Commission, 130 Conn. App. 587 (2011):
(Bear, J.) The Appellate Court held that the plaintiffs’ zoning appeal was improperly dismissed, as they had alleged facts sufficient to show statutory aggrievement.  They alleged that they owned property in the affected zone, that buildable area within that zone was redefined, and that their property was affected by the amendment in that the amendment constituted a taking of their property.  This sufficiently plead statutory aggrievement.  The Appellate Court remanded the case to the superior court with instructions to determine whether the plaintiffs had proven statutory aggrievement.

Dallaire v. Hsu, 130 Conn. App. 599 (2011):
(DiPentima, C.J.) In a medical malpractice case, the trial court did not err in weighing the opinion of the defendant’s expert over those of the plaintiff’s experts.  The plaintiff’s experts were less experienced in the relevant field (pain management) than the defendant’s expert.  Further, the defendant did not breach the applicable standard of care in prescribing the plaintiff’s decedent pain medication.  He was not required to consult with the decedent’s prior health care providers or to independently obtain her pharmacy records, especially given the fact that she provided him with pharmacy records, although incomplete ones.  The proper standard of care was followed, in that the defendant, “spoke with the patient, took a detailed history and, on the basis of all the circumstances, prescribed medications accordingly.”

Martocchio v. Savoir, 130 Conn. App. 626 (2011):
(Per Curiam) The plaintiff was found in contempt of court for failing to allow his child’s maternal grandparents to visit the child, despite a court ordered visitation schedule.  The trial court also ordered a psychological evaluation of the plaintiff, as the court found that he could not control himself in the courtroom and had an “extreme attitude” toward the care of his child.  The Appellate Court affirmed the finding of contempt, as there was a clear visitation order, and the plaintiff admitted to violating that order.  The Court also affirmed the order for an evaluation, as such an order is inherent in the trial court’s power to ensure compliance with the visitation schedule.

Connecticut Supreme Court

None.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Bode v. Connecticut Mason Contractors, The Learning Corridor, 130 Conn. App. 672 (2011):
(Alvord, J.)  The plaintiff employee, who had been injured during the course of his employment with the defendant contractor when he fell about thirty feet from scaffolding, was denied certain disability benefits by the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner and appealed.  The Workers’ Compensation Review Board affirmed the judgment of the Commissioner, and the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment in part and reversed the judgment in part.  Specifically, the Court held that the Board improperly affirmed the Commissioner’s decision that the plaintiff was not temporarily totally disabled, as the Commissioner had misapplied the law in coming to that conclusion.  In addition, the Court held that the Board properly affirmed the Commissioner’s finding that the plaintiff’s psychiatric claim was not compensable, as the record was insufficient to support that claim.

Water Pollution Control Authority v. Johnson, 130 Conn. App. 692 (2011):
(Peters, J.)  The plaintiff Water Pollution Control Authority sought to foreclose on a sewer use lien on property owned by the defendant.  When the defendant was defaulted for failure to appear, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff of foreclosure by sale.  The property was thereafter sold to a third-party company, which was added as a defendant to this action.  It was subsequently determined that the plaintiff’s foreclosure complaint had failed to reference a mortgage on the property.  The interest holder in the mortgage obtained a judgment of foreclosure on the property bought by the third-party company on the ground that the lien had been omitted from the original foreclosure action.  The third-party company then filed a motion to open and to vacate the foreclosure judgment in the original action and all supplemental judgments, which the trial court denied and from which the company appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court had properly relied on the statute concerning the rights of a purchase acquiring title at a foreclosure sale and the rule of caveat emptor, and that the trial court was properly within its discretion in denying the company’s motion to open and vacate.

 McCoy v. Brown, 130 Conn. App. 702 (2011):
(Peters, J.)  The plaintiffs, prospective buyers, sued the defendants, the sellers, for damages from the defendants’ refusal to return the plaintiffs’ deposit toward the purchase of the defendants’ home.  The plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, statutory theft, and conversion.  The defendants filed a counterclaim, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract.  The trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendants on both the complaint and the counterclaim, and the plaintiffs appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a return of their deposit, as they had failed to exercise due diligence to secure a mortgage at the prevailing rate after learning that they were ineligible for financing at their preferred rate.  The defendants’ refusal to return the deposition was not a violation of the mortgage contingency clause, and they could retain the deposit as liquidated damages.

Retirement Program for Employees of the Town of Fairfield v. Madoff, 130 Conn. App. 710 (2011):
(Bishop, J.)  The plaintiffs, the town of Fairfield and two retirement programs for town employees, sued the defendants for, inter alia, statutory theft in connection with the investment of their funds with the defendant investment firm which, in turn, invested the funds with the defendant Bernard L. Madoff.  Madoff had admitted to having orchestrated a massive Ponzi scheme.  Several defendants, including the investment company, filed motions to dismiss on the basis that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their claims were derivative in nature with respect to them.  The trial court denied the motion to dismiss as to the investment company but granted the other defendants’ motions to dismiss, and the plaintiffs appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) that the plaintiffs’ claims against the other defendants that were partners, principles and members of a board of directors for certain hedge funds that invested with Madoff were, in fact, derivative claims that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring; and (2) that the claims against the defendant Madoff’s brother, who was a co-owner, were also derivative claims that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring.

Perry v. Perry, 130 Conn. App. 720 (2011):
(Peters, J.)  After the trial court had dissolved the parties marriage, ordered alimony and child support, and divided the parties’ assets, the plaintiff ex-wife filed an ex parte motion for an order and to clarify postjudgment, and filed a motion to open on the grounds of a scrivener’s error or mutual mistake with respect to the parenting time as expressed in the parties’ stipulation.  The trial court thereafter issued separate clarifications; one was with respect to the parties’ parenting plan, and one was with respect to an order relating to the division of the parties’ property, in which the court clarified that the parties were responsible for the liabilities listed on their respective financial affidavits and that each of them was required to indemnify and hold harmless the other.  The defendant ex-husband appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in part and reversed the judgment in part.  The Court held that the trial court’s subsequent order that the children shall be with the ex-husband every other Friday did not modify any of the substantive terms of the prior dissolution judgment but instead clarified an ambiguity therein.  The Court also held that the trial court did not have the authority to issue, as a clarifying order, its modification of the original judgment with respect to division of the parties’ property.