Connecticut Supreme Court

Pham v. Starkowski, 300 Conn. 412 (2011):
(Zarella, J.) The plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Public Act 09-05, which substantially eliminated the state medical assistance for noncitizens program (SMANC), discriminated against those noncitizens who had been in the country for fewer than five years because they were ineligible for federal Medicaid and now had no state assistance available either.  The Supreme Court held that the Act was not discriminatory because it did not distinguish on the basis of citizenship – SMANC never provided benefits to citizens so there was no line drawn based on citizenship.  Further, the Act’s changes to the state administered general assistance medical program (SAGA-medical) were not discriminatory either.  Eligibility for SAGA-medical depends solely on non-eligibility for federal Medicaid, not on citizenship.  The state did not discriminate because it did not use citizenship as a qualifying factor.  Lastly, because the qualifications were not based on alienage, they did not violate the state equal protection clause.

In re Lukas K., 300 Conn. 463 (2011):
(Rogers, C.J.) The trial court terminated the father’s parental rights after denying the father’s request for a continuance and for a trial transcript.  The appellate court affirmed the judgment, finding that the father failed to establish that he had a constitutional due process right to the continuance or the transcript.  On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the father’s due process rights were not violated because he did not prove that he could have presented any new evidence as to his relationship with his child and therefore, failed to prove that either the continuance or the transcript would have reduced the risk of terminating his parental rights in error.

State v. Bacon Construction Co., 300 Conn. 476 (2011):
(Vertefeuille, J.) The State filed an application for a prejudgment remedy, after receiving an arbitration award against its favor.  The defendant objected, based on collateral estoppel, which the trial court overruled.  The defendant appealed, but the Supreme Court held that the overruling was not a final appealable judgment and dismissed the appeal.  The Court further held that the appeal from the denial of the collateral estoppel defense could only be brought once the trial court ruled on the application for prejudgment rememdy.  The Court further declined to extend Convalescent Center of Bloomfield, Inc. v. Dept. of Income Maintenance, 208 Conn. 187 (1988), beyond the administrative context in which that case was decided.

In re Johnson R., 300 Conn. 486 (2011):
(Per Curiam) The father appealed the termination of his parental rights.  The Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court properly found that his claim was unpreserved because he failed to provide transcripts, exhibits, the memorandum of decision, or the motion for articulation.  The Appellate Court properly dismissed his appeal.

Lash v. Freedom of Information Commission, 300 Conn. 511 (2011):
(McLachlan, J.) The plaintiff appealed from a decision of the defendant commission ordering the plaintiff to produce documents that it argued were protected under the attorney-client privilege.  The trial court held that the documents were privileged.  The commission appealed, and the appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court had failed to apply the four-factor test laid out in Shew v. Freedom of Information Commission, 245 Conn. 149 (1998), and remanded for a determination under that test.  The Supreme Court held that the appellate court was correct in that Shew should have been applied, but since the trial court found that the only “reasonable conclusion” the commission could have come to is that the documents were privileged, the remand was unnecessary.  Further, the Court found that the documents were clearly privileged.  The Appellate Court also properly reversed the trial court’s upholding of the civil penalty imposed against the plaintiff for his failure to produce the documents.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 127 Conn. App. 606 (2011):
(Lavine, J.) The defendant’s appealed the denial of their motions for summary judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in holding that the action was not barred by res judicata.  The Appellate Court agreed, and reversed the decision of the trial court.  In prior cases, motions to strike had been granted because the plaintiffs failed to state proper claims.  As such, the motions to strike precluded this claim via res judicata.

Mehan v. Stamford, 127 Conn. App. 619 (2011):
(Beach, J.) The city appealed from the decision of the compensation review board affirming the trial commissioner’s award of workers compensation benefits to the plaintiff.  The city claimed that the commissioner erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion to preclude, in denying the city’s motion for reconsideration, and in finding that the plaintiff’s injury was compensable and work-related.  The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the commissioner properly granted the plaintiff’s motion to preclude because the partially filled-out Form 30C was sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the plaintiff’s claims, and triggered the city’s obligation to file a Form 43.  Further, the motion for reconsideration was properly denied, as the commissioner was bound by the Supreme Court’s previous decision as to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-294(c) and could not reevaluate that Court’s decisions.  As to compensability, the commissioner properly found that the injury was work-related, because the acute coronary syndrome stemming from a work-related incident was a substantial contributing factor to the aggravation of his preexisting coronary artery disease.  The syndrome created a permanent increase in the plaintiff’s level of disability, and was compensable.

Diamond 67, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 127 Conn. App. 634 (2011):
(Alvord, J.) An environmental intervenor appealed from the trial court’s approval of a settlement between the plaintiff Diamond 67 and the zoning board, claiming that the court improperly approved the settlement, improperly denied his request for a continuance, and misinterpreted a prior remand order.  The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court, holding that the intervenor did have standing to bring the present appeal, but that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance as his counsel appeared at the hearing and the plaintiff, defendant, and their witnesses also were present and ready to proceed.  The Court also held that as to the remand order, the trial court followed the mandate.  Finally, as to the approval of the settlement, the intervenor lost his right to challenge the settlement, as he failed to raise environmental issues during the settlement hearing.

Burton v. Stamford, 127 Conn. App. 651 (2011):
(Per Curiam) The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  The defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because of an arbitration decision in a related case that addressed liability in this case.  The trial court granted the motion, and the Appellate Court affirmed, adopting the trial court’s decision as its own.

Komondy v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 127 Conn. App. 669 (2011):
(Gruendel, J.) The plaintiff appealed from the superior court’s dismissal of her appeal from the defendant zoning board’s decision denying her application for a variance and dismissing her appeal from the decision of the zoning enforcement officer.  She appealed on the grounds that one of the board members was seated illegally.  The Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of her appeal, holding that the board member properly participated.  Although the member was not seated to act on the plaintiff’s applications, she participated in the public hearing and in the board’s subsequent deliberations.  The record revealed that she was, in fact, a very active participant, and the statute which provided for her participation (§8-5(a)) did not preclude the participation of an unseated alternate board member at the public hearing, but that it does preclude participation of an unseated alternate during the deliberations.  The Court found that the board did err in allowing the particular member’s participation, and announced the standard by which to evaluate the plaintiff’s claim, namely, where there was material prejudice to the plaintiff.  The Court did not actually apply that standard, however, because the trial court independently found that the variance was not warranted, and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal properly.

Emrich v. Emrich, 127 Conn. App. 691 (2011):
(Beach, J.) In a dissolution proceeding, the husband appealed the trial court’s financial orders and custody order allowing the wife to relocate to Maine those children for whom she had primary custody.  The Appellate Court affirmed.  As to the custody order, the trial court properly found that the wife proved that the relocation was for a legitimate purpose, that it was reasonable, and that it was in the best interests of the children.  As to the financial orders, however, due to the husband’s failure to file a motion for review of the trial court’s denial of his motion for rearguement or articulation, the Appellate Court was precluded from reviewing his claims.

418 Meadow Street Associates, LLC v. One Solution Services, LLC, 127 Conn. App. 711 (2011):
(Alvord, J.) The defendant appealed the trial court’s entry of a default judgment against him, despite the fact that his counsel had raised a question of the plaintiff’s standing.  The trial court failed to address the standing issue prior to its entering default.  The defendant filed a motion to open the default, which was denied.  The Appellate Court reversed the denial of the motion to open, holding that once a question of standing is raised, it must be addressed by the trial court.  The court erred in entering a default judgment prior to addressing the question of the plaintiff’s standing.

In re Joshua S., 127 Conn. App. 723 (2011):
(Beach, J.) The child’s foster parents appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion to intervene, claiming that the court abused its discretion in not granting the motion and erred by not holding a hearing to determine if exceptional circumstances existed to allow them to intervene.  The Appellate Court dismissed their appeal, holding that foster parents do not have a colorable claim to intervene as a matter of right, and therefore, are not parties entitled to appeal a trial court’s order.

Connecticut Supreme Court

Levine v. Sterling, 300 Conn. 521 (2011):
(Eveleigh, J.)  The plaintiff brought suit against the defendants, the town of Sterling and its building official, after the defendants refused to issue the plaintiff permits to build two additional dwelling units on his property.  The trial court rendered judgment for the defendants and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly found that the town had validly enacted its land use ordinance and that the plaintiff did not prove the substantial loss element necessary to prevail on his municipal estoppel claim.  The Supreme Court, after transferring the appeal to itself, affirmed the judgment in part and reversed the judgment in part, holding that the trial court improperly applied the substantial loss test to the plaintiff’s municipal estoppel claim.  Specifically, the Court held that the trial court held the plaintiff to too strict of a showing under the substantial loss test by improperly focusing on whether the plaintiff made improvements that were rendered useless and whether construction of the additional dwellings had already begun.  Instead, the primary consideration is much broader: whether a party has made significant expenditures in reliance upon the representation of a municipal official.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Ocsai v. Exit 88 Hotel, LLC, 127 Conn. App. 731 (2011):
(Robinson, J.)  The plaintiff, a cleaning service employee, suffered a partial amputation of several fingers on her left hand due to a malfunction of a towel folding machine.  The plaintiff thereafter filed suit against the defendant hotel, alleging negligence and recklessness.  The hotel impleaded the contractor that provided the hotel personnel, seeking contractual indemnification.  The hotel then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.  The contractor appealed and the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the term “operations” in the indemnification provision of the labor services contract between the hotel and the contractor was ambiguous.  As such, it involved a genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment should not have been granted.

Tuxis Ohr’s Fuel, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 127 Conn. App. 739 (2011):
(Peters, J.)  The plaintiff employer appealed to the trial court from the decision of the Employment Security Board of Review finding that a former employee of the plaintiff was entitled to unemployment benefits.  The former employee’s commercial driver’s license was suspended after he was arrested for, on his own time, driving while intoxicated.  The Board of Review construed the relevant unemployment compensation statutes in favor of awarding unemployment benefits, finding that the statutory requirement for disqualification from unemployment benefits is with regard to failing a state or federal alcohol testing program, not being arrested on one’s own time for driving while intoxicated.  The trial court agreed with the Board of Review and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that there was nothing in the record to establish that the employee lost his commercial driver’s license under a state law program, as the statute requires.  As such, the plaintiff failed to satisfy its burden of showing disqualification from unemployment benefits and the appeal was properly dismissed.

Brennan Associates v. OBGYN Specialty Group, P.C., 127 Conn. App. 746 (2011):
(Dupont, J.)  The plaintiff, a commercial lessor of shopping center premises, filed suit against the defendants for failure to pay rent and other charges due under the lease.  The defendants counterclaimed, alleging a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff’s claim and in favor of the plaintiff on the defendants’ counterclaim.  The plaintiff and defendants appealed and cross-appealed, respectively.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in the plaintiff’s appeal, holding that the plaintiff’s failure to accept a new tenant – a tanning salon – proposed by the defendants did not breach the plaintiff’s duty to mitigate damages.  The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in the defendants’ cross-appeal, however, holding that the plaintiff did not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Brown v. Fenyes, 127 Conn. App. 771 (2011):
(Per Curiam.)  The plaintiffs, the estate administrator and trustee, filed a summary process action against the defendant occupant, alleging that he no longer had right or privilege to occupy the premises in question.  The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and the defendant appealed.  While the appeal was pending, the trial court entered an order requiring the defendant to make monthly use and occupancy payments.  The defendant filed an amended appeal from that order.  The plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal and amended appeal when the defendant failed to make payments as required.  The Appellate Court dismissed the amended appeal, holding that the sole remedy for seeking review of an order of use and occupancy is through a motion for review.  In addition, the Court dismissed the original appeal, holding that the defendant had failed to comply with the bond requirement for use and occupancy payments, which made the appeal voidable.

 Park National Bank v. 3333 Main, LLC, 127 Conn. App. 774 (2011):
(Alvord, J.)  The plaintiff bank filed an action against the defendant mortgager for strict foreclosure.  The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability and the defendant appealed, claiming that the court improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was the holder of the note at the time the action was commenced.  The defendant argued that this created an issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff lacked standing, therefore depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine the plaintiff’s standing.

Jason Roberts, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 127 Conn. App. 780 (2011):
(Robinson, J.)  The plaintiff, a concrete business, employed the unemployment compensation claimant as a concrete artisan before he set up his own business and entered into an agreement with the plaintiff as a licensed dealer.  The plaintiff classified the claimant as an independent contractor.  After a couple of years, the claimant terminated the agreement because it was no longer profitable for him.  He thereafter filed a claim for unemployment benefits.  The plaintiff’s business was subsequently audited as a result of this claim, and the defendant Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act concluded that the claimant was an employee and not an independent contractor during that time.  The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appeals Division and a hearing was held before an Appeals Referee.  The Referee affirmed the determination that the claimant was an employee of the plaintiff and the plaintiff appealed that decision to the Employment Security Board of Review, which modified and adopted the Referee’s findings of fact, affirmed the decision, and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal.  The trial court affirmed the Board of Review’s decision and rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal.  Finally, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the Board applied the correct legal standard to the facts found and properly determined that the claimant was an employee of the plaintiff.

Fritz v. Fritz, 127 Conn. App. 788 (2011):
(Lavery, J.)  The plaintiff ex-husband appealed the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the defendant ex-wife, claiming that the trial court improperly awarded him nonmodifiable, time-limited periodic alimony and made improper assumptions about his contributions to the parties’ home equity line of credit.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the record contained sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings as to alimony and that the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion.  Additionally, the Court held that the trial court was within its discretion when it found that the plaintiff had made a payment toward the balance owed on the home equity line of credit, contrary to the plaintiff’s claim on appeal.

Discover Bank v. Mayer, 127 Conn. App. 813 (2011):
(Robinson, J.)  The plaintiff, Discover Bank, filed suit against the defendant for damages due under a credit card agreement.  The trial court entered a default judgment requiring the defendant to make installment payments.  In addition, the court denied the plaintiff’s request for postjudgment interest and the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that under the relevant statute, an award of postjudgment interest is discretionary.  Because the plaintiff did not claim on appeal that the trial court’s denial of its request for postjudgment interest constituted an abuse of discretion, and because the award itself is discretionary, the Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

In re Kyle L., 127 Conn. App. 859 (2011):
(Per Curiam.)  The respondent mother appealed from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights as to the minor child.  The respondent claimed that the trial court improperly found that she had failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation because there was insufficient evidence to support such a conclusion.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court’s findings were detailed, thoroughly stated and adequately covered all of the statutory requirements.  Concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion, the Appellate Court denied the respondent’s appeal.

Connecticut Supreme Court

Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542 (2011):
(Zarella, J.) The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s dismissal of her suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The plaintiff challenged a decision of the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission that approved a 7% power uprate in one of the defendant’s units.  The plaintiff sought an injunction, damages, and other relief on the grounds that the uprate would cause unreasonable pollution in Long Island Sound and to an estuary that she owns property near.  The trial court dismissed her complaint for lack of standing.  On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s complaint was not moot because a reversal of the uprate was potentially feasible both financially and technically.  The plaintiff’s claim as to unreasonable pollution for the increase of radioactive waste was properly dismissed, as it was preempted by federal law.  The plaintiff’s claim as to unreasonable pollution for the increase in the temperature of the thermal plume was properly dismissed for lack of standing.  The plaintiff did not allege “substantive” violations that caused unreasonable pollution, as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-16.  Her public nuisance claim was also properly dismissed for lack of standing, as her claim alleged general, global statements of harm without distinguishing how she would be personally harmed.

Alexandre v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 300 Conn. 566 (2011):
(Norcott, J.) The plaintiff was audited, and as part of the audit, submitted “Z reports,” which were cash register receipt tapes that included only the date, sequence number, and the cumulative amount of cash run through the register.  The Court affirmed the trial court, in holding that the Z reports did not satisfy the plaintiff’s obligation to keep proper taxpayer records under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-426 and §12-2-12 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.  The Z reports were not properly substituted for detailed cash register tapes because they did not provide documentation of individual sales or transactions, as required by the statute and regulation.

Connecticut Motor Cars v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 300 Conn. 617 (2011):
(McLachlan, J.) The Court held that § 14-63-36c(c) does not allow a licensed motor vehicle dealer or repairer to charge a “gate fee” in addition to a regular towing fee.  The plaintiffs here charged a “gate fee” to people whose cards they had towed to bring the car from their secured storage area to the area where the owner could retrieve the car.  After complaints were filed with the department of motor vehicles, a hearing was held, and the hearing officer determined that these “gate fees” were supposed to be included in the towing fees, per § 14-63-36c of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.  The plaintiff appealed, and the trial court affirmed the decision.  The Supreme Court further affirmed, holding that the term “tow charge” as used in the Regulations includes all the activities for which the “gate fee” was charged, and therefore, the that extra “gate fee” was improperly charged.

 HVT, Inc. v. Law, 300 Conn. 623 (2011):
(Norcott, J.) The Supreme Court held that vehicle registration renewal fees on leased cars qualify as part of a lessor’s “gross receipts” subject to sales tax under § 12-408(1), and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  The Court relied in part on the lease agreements, which provided that the renewal fees, paid by the lessees of the cars, “are part of the gross receipts attributable to the lease and are therefore subject to sales tax.”  They also interpreted the statute and look to the history of receipts subject to sales tax.  Because the responsibility of paying the renewal fee is solely on the owner of the car, and not the lessee of the car, the payments made by the lessees directly were not reimbursements to the lessor.   The lessees’ payments of the renewal fees instead directly benefitted the lessor financially because it relieved the lessor of its obligation to pay the fees.  As such, it is properly considered part of the lessor’s gross receipts.
Eveleigh, J., Dissenting.  The payment of the renewal fees does not count toward taxable gross receipts because it does not benefit the lessor.  Because the payments are not part of the sale and were never due from the lessees to the lessor to begin with, it does not benefit the lessor financially, and should not be interpreted to be taxable under the statute.

Piteau v. Board of Education, 300 Conn. 667 (2011):
(Palmer, J.) The plaintiff was disciplined at work, filed a grievance, and participated in arbitration, which resulted in an unfavorable outcome to him.  Thereafter, the plaintiff instituted the present action claiming that the board of education had breached its collective bargaining agreement by not providing fair representation during the arbitration proceedings.  The board filed a motion to dismiss because the plaintiff had not brought a complaint with the state board of labor relations.  The Supreme Court held that the trial court properly dismissed the action on these grounds, as exhaustion of his administrative remedies was required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-468(d).  The state board of labor relations had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims and would have been able to overturn the arbitration award and reinstate the plaintiff to his former position, had those remedies been appropriate.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Mirjavadi v. Vakilzadeh, 127 Conn. App. 61 (2011):
(Lavine, J.) The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s decision in favor of the defendant.  The plaintiff had hired the defendant to supervise her daughter’s visits with the father of the child.  The plaintiff and the father were divorced, and the father was only allowed supervised visits.  At one of these visits, the father kidnapped the child and brought the child to Turkey, while she was supposed to be under the defendant’s supervision.  The Appellate Court reversed the finding for the defendant, and remanded for a new trial.  The Court held that the trial court erroneously found some critical facts in the case, which errors were harmful, and that because of the errors in fact finding, the decision could not stand.

Sierra v. C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 127 Conn. App. 78 (2011):
(Bishop, J.) The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the compensation review board, which affirmed the workers compensation commissioner in denying benefits for a 50% impairment to the claimant’s abdominal wall.  The abdominal wall is not a scheduled body part in § 31-308(b), but a commissioner has discretion to accept or deny a claim for unscheduled body parts.  Here, the commissioner did not err in rejecting the claim, as he found the medical evidence to be lacking.

Caltabiano v. L & L Real Estate Holdings II, LLC, 127 Conn. App. 84 (2011):
(Harper, J.) The Appellate Court held that a judgment of nonsuit was properly rendered after the plaintiffs failed to file a substitute revised amended complaint that was responsive to the court’s orders upon striking the amended complaint.  The substitute complaint was materially identical to the amended complaint stricken by the trial court. 

Horenian v. Washington, 127 Conn. App. 91 (2011):
(Lavery, J.) The plaintiff sued the defendant police officer and the police department for which the defendant worked for emotional distress and abuse of process in relation to an investigation of a car accident in which the plaintiff was involved.  The plaintiff was found at fault for the accident, but all charges against him were nolled.  The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants.  On appeal, the Appellate Court held that a portion of the plaintiff’s appeal was moot.  The plaintiff appealed in part on the grounds that the trial court erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact, when the court had also based its decision granting summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds.  The appeal on this issue was moot, as the plaintiff did not appeal both grounds for granting summary judgment.  Further, the plaintiff appealed the granting of summary judgment arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the officer’s conduct was not extreme and outrageous, as required to successfully claim a case of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The Appellate Court held that the trial court properly interpreted the evidence, and did not err in finding a lack of extreme and outrageous conduct.  The Court affirmed the decision granting summary judgment.

Vance v. Tassmer, 127 Conn. App. 101 (2011):
(Alvord, J.) The parties entered into an agreement regarding a shared boundary line between their properties, whereby the plaintiffs would obtain a portion of the defendant’s property by adverse possession after certain conditions outlined in the agreement were met.  The plaintiffs later sought to have the agreement enforced.  The Appellate Court held that the agreement was enforceable, as the language was not ambiguous and that the plaintiffs pursued a variance, as required by the agreement, in good faith.  Further, the trial court did not err in finding that the defendants did not act in good faith in pursuing a variance.  The Court found that the evidence did weigh toward the trial court’s findings.  The Appellate Court reversed in part, however, because the trial court did err in awarding the subject property to the plaintiffs.  The Court found that certain contingencies in the agreement were not met, and under the terms of the agreement, the property was not rightfully transferred to the plaintiffs until those contingencies were met.

Rostad v. Hirsch, 127 Conn. App. 119 (2011):
(Peters, J.) After a paternity action concluded that the defendant was the father of the plaintiff’s child, the plaintiff was awarded over $180,000 in attorneys’ fees among the various members of her litigation team.  The defendant appealed the award.  The Appellate Court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, holding that the trial court's pendente lite fee award was a final judgment under the Curcio test.  The Court also found that the awards for the plaintiff’s second and third attorneys were an abuse of discretion, as both attorneys were not licensed in Connecticut, not experienced in paternity matters, and had lined up local counsel.  Only a nominal fee award would have been appropriate.

PIC Associates, LLC v. Greenwich Place GL Acquisition, LLC, 127 Conn. App. 151 (2011):
(Lavine, J.) In a commercial summary process action, the Court held that the defendant was negligent, but not grossly negligent, in failing to pay rent and in failing to bond off mechanics liens placed on the leased property.  This allowed the defendant to prove its special defense of nonforfeiture.  This was further evidenced by the fact that the plaintiff contributed to the defendant’s late bonding off of the mechanics liens, in that the plaintiff did not respond to the defendant’s letter providing the plaintiff with a surety bond.

Community Renewal Team, Inc. v. United States Liability Ins. Co., 127 Conn. App. 174 (2011):
(Borden, J.) The defendant insurance company was sued for its failure to defend a personal injury claim brought against the plaintiff, who was insured by the defendant.  The insurance contract excluded any bodily injury sustained while participating in any athletic activity.  The Appellate Court held that the policy unambiguously excluded the injuries sustained by the person who sued the plaintiff.  The injured person was participating in a “challenge course,” part of which required her to “ascend to an elevated platform and perform a free fall with a rope.”  This is what she was doing when she was injured.  The trial court found, and the Appellate Court affirmed, that this was participation in an athletic activity and coverage was excluded from the insurance policy.

Traylor v. State, 127 Conn. App. 182 (2011):
(Per Curiam) The trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s application for a writ of mandamus, as he failed to show that no other specific adequate remedy would have been available to him to have the court’s actions reviewed.  Further, mandamus was not warranted because the review sought in the application is available on appeal when a final judgment is rendered. 

In re Anvahnay S., 127 Conn. App. 186 (2011):
(DiPentima, C.J.) The father appealed the termination of his parental rights arguing that the trial court erroneously found that DCF had made reasonable efforts and erroneously found that he failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation.  The Appellate Court affirmed the termination, holding that DCF had made reasonable efforts.  Given the father’s incarceration and his failure to communicate with DCF, the department made reasonable efforts, although more could have been done.  Further, evidence indicated that the father lacked the ability or willingness to be a parent to his child.  He failed to rehabilitate in that he did not seek out or take advantage of any of the programs available to him to further his rehabilitation.

Connecticut Supreme Court

Bedrick v. Bedrick, 300 Conn. 691 (2011):
(McLachlan, J.)  The plaintiff ex-wife brought an action for the dissolution of the parties’ marriage, seeking, inter alia, permanent alimony and the equal distribution of the parties’ real and personal property.  The defendant ex-husband filed a cross-complaint, seeking to enforce the parties’ postnuptial agreement in which it is specifically provided that, in the event of dissolution, neither party will pay alimony.  The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the post-nuptial agreement was unenforceable and ordering the defendant to pay lump-sum alimony to the plaintiff.  The defendant appealed and, after transferring the case to itself, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that, as a matter of first impression, postnuptial agreements can be enforceable and must comply with contract principles.  The terms of postnuptial agreements must, however, be both fair and equitable at the time of execution and not unconscionable at the time of dissolution.  Finding that the parties’ postnuptial agreement was unconscionable at the time of trial, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Nyenhuis v. Metropolitan District Commission, 300 Conn. 708 (2011):
(Norcott, J.)  The plaintiff police officer brought suit against the defendant after having been placed on administrative duty for charges regarding an altercation that occurred while the plaintiff was on duty and after having subsequently been acquitted of those charges.  The plaintiff was restored to the status of an active duty police officer and filed complaints against the defendant seeking reinstatement of vacation and earned time that she had used while suspended.  She also sued the defendant under General Statutes § 53-39a, seeking indemnification for economic loss sustained by a police officer following a prosecution concluding with a verdict of not guilty.  The trial court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to indemnification for economic loss.  The defendant appealed and the Supreme Court, after transferring the appeal to itself, reversed in part, holding that although the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff was entitled to recover economic losses, the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to recover those losses from the date of the incident that served as the base of the criminal charges against her.  The Court concluded that because the trial court did not make a specific finding as to whether the defendant placed the plaintiff on administrative duty because of the police investigation, the case was remanded for a new hearing to ascertain the same.  In addition, the Court held that the defendant could not prevail on its other claims on appeal involving subject matter jurisdiction and interpretation of the term “economic loss” in the controlling statute.

Motzer v. Haberli, 300 Conn. 733 (2011):
(Zarella, J.)  The plaintiff employee brought suit seeking damages from the defendants, who constituted his employer, for their alleged intentional creation of dangerous work conditions.  Those conditions allegedly resulted in the plaintiff’s injury during the course of employment.  After the plaintiff rested his case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict claiming that the workers’ compensation statute barred the plaintiff’s claim because he had already received workers’ compensation benefits for his injury and he had failed to prove either that the defendants had intentionally caused the injury or that they knew it was certain to occur because of their conduct.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motion and rendered judgment accordingly.  The plaintiff appealed and the Supreme Court, after transferring the appeal to itself, affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court was properly within its discretion (1) when it precluded the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert because it was speculative; and (2) when it excluded certain documents and testimony because it was cumulative.  The Court also held that the trial court properly directed a verdict for the defendants because the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy was under the workers’ compensation statute and the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish an exception to that rule.

Connecticut Appellate Court

Gillians v. Vivanco-Small, 128 Conn. App. 207 (2011):
(Bishop, J.)  The plaintiff, a former employee of the Department of Children and Families as a social worker, sued the defendant Department employees for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The plaintiff claimed that the defendants retaliated against her because she filed an institutional labor grievance against them.  She claims that they conspired to force her to withdraw her grievance and that certain of the employees became hostile and uncooperative toward her.  In addition, she alleged that three employees had given her a negative performance evaluation and ultimately terminated her employment, which termination was later reversed by the Department.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that summary judgment was properly granted because the plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient extreme or outrageous conduct to sustain her claim.

Jaeger v. Connecticut Siting Council, 128 Conn. App. 243 (2011):
(Per Curiam.)  The plaintiff filed an administrative appeal from the decision of the defendant Connecticut Siting Council granting a certificate of environmental compatibility to another company for the construction, operation and maintenance of a wireless telecommunications facility.  The trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of standing because it concluded that the plaintiff was not aggrieved.  The plaintiff appealed this dismissal, claiming that the trial court judge improperly failed to disqualify himself in violation of the law.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the plaintiff had waived her claim that the judge had improperly failed to disqualify himself because she had withdrawn her motion for disqualification of the trial judge before the court could consider the motion.

Lee v. Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP, 128 Conn. App. 250 (2011):
(Alvord, J.)  The plaintiff employee sued the defendants, attorneys who drafted his employment agreement, for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation.  When the plaintiff was discharged from his employer, allegedly without cause, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendants.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment accordingly.  The plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial court had improperly found that the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for tort actions.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the statute of limitations was not tolled under either the doctrine of continuing representation or the doctrine of continuing course of conduct.

Luster v. Luster, 128 Conn. App. 259 (2011):
(Bear, J.)  The plaintiff ex-wife brought an action seeking a legal separation from the defendant ex-husband, who suffered from senile dementia and was deemed incompetent.  She also sued the parties’ daughters, who had been appointed temporary conservators of the defendant’s person and estate.  After the conservators were made permanent, they filed a cross complaint seeking a dissolution of the marriage on the defendant’s behalf.  The trial court dismissed the cross complaint and the conservators appealed.  The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that, as a matter of first impression, a conservator may bring a civil action for dissolution of marriage on behalf of a conserved person, and that the conservators had the authority to file a cross complaint for dissolution on behalf of the defendant, if his interests could be best protected through the filing of such an action.  Justice Borden filed a separate concurrence.

Vanicky v. Vanicky, 128 Conn. App. 281 (2011):
(Per Curiam.)  The defendant ex-wife appealed from the decision of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff ex-husband.  The defendant claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff attorneys’ fees and allowing the plaintiff to retain sole ownership of the marital property.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making either finding.

Costello v. Commissioner of Developmental Services, 128 Conn. App. 286 (2011):
(Peters, J.)  The plaintiff filed an administrative appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Developmental Services to deny the plaintiff’s application to obtain access to the services provided by the Department of Social Services.  In particular, the defendant found that the plaintiff did not meet the definition of “mental retardation” after evaluating her scores on a number of intelligence tests.  The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal, from which dismissal the plaintiff again appealed.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the evidence supported the defendant’s finding that the plaintiff did not meet the definition of “mental retardation,” and that the plaintiff failed to establish a lack of notice in violation of due process.

Falls Mill of Vernon Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Sudsbury, 128 Conn. App. 314 (2011):
(Gruendel, J.)  The plaintiff Condominium Association initiated a foreclosure action on a property subject to a mortgage held by the defendant company.  After the defendant failed to appear, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motions for default and for judgment of strict foreclosure.  More than one year later, the defendant filed a motion to open, claiming that it did not receive notice of the plaintiff’s motion for default, the ruling on that motion, or the judgment of strict foreclosure at its corporate office in Illinois.  The defendant appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that because the defendant was a nonappearing party, pursuant to the Practice Book, the failure to give proper notice of the judgment of strict foreclosure did not affect the running of the appeal period.

In re Sarah O., 128 Conn. App. 323 (2011):
(Bear, J.)  The respondent mother appealed from the termination of her parental rights as to her daughter, Sarah O.  The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the respondent could not prevail on her claim that her due process rights were violated because the trial court considered the post-trial position statement of the child’s attorney, as such consideration was harmless and did not constitute plain error.  In addition, the Court held that clear and convincing evidence in the record supported the trial court’s determination that the respondent did not achieve sufficient rehabilitation.  Finally, the Court concluded that the trial court did not commit clear error in finding that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate the respondent’s parental rights.